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The Fault Is Not in Our Stars:
Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space
David A. Koplow*
Men at some time are masters of their fates;
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
—William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act 1, sc. 2
The world is on the precipice of a new arms race in outer space, as China, Russia, the United States,
and others undertake dramatic new initiatives in anti-satellite weaponry. These accelerated competitive
efforts at space control are highly destabilizing because developed societies have come to depend so heavily
upon satellite services to support the entire civilian economy and the modern military apparatus; any
significant threat or disruption in the availability of space assets would be massively, and possibly perma-
nently, disruptive.
International law regarding outer space developed with remarkable rapidity in the early years of the
Space Age, but the process of formulating additional treaties and norms for space has broken down over the
past several decades; no additional legal instruments have emerged that could cope with today’s rising
threats. This Article therefore proposes three initiatives. Although none of them can suffice to solve the
emerging problems, they could, perhaps, provide additional diplomacy, reinvigorating the prospects for
rapprochement in space. Importantly, each of these three ideas has deep roots in other sectors of arms control,
where they have served both to restore a measure of stability and to catalyze even more ambitious agree-
ments in the longer term.
The first proposal is for a declaratory regime of “no first use” of specified space weapons; this would do
little to directly alter states’ capabilities for space warfare, but could serve as a “confidence-building
measure,” to temper their most provocative rhetoric and practices. The second concept is a “limited test
ban,” to interdict the most dangerous debris-creating developmental tests of new space weapons. Third is a
suggestion for shared “space situational awareness,” which would create an international apparatus ena-
bling all participants to enjoy the benefits of greater transparency, reducing the possibilities for secret
malign or negligent behavior. In each instance, the Article describes the proposal and its variations,
assesses its possible contributions to space security, and displays the key precedents from other arms-control
successes.
The Article concludes by calling for additional, further-reaching space diplomacy, in the hope that these
relatively modest initial measures could provoke more robust subsequent negotiations.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is deeply indebted to the follow-
ing experts, colleagues, and friends who reviewed earlier drafts of this manuscript and provided invalua-
ble critique and suggestions: Allison K. Astorino-Courtois, Arthur E. Baer, Jr., Jack M. Beard, Martin C.
Faga, Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Mark A. Gubrud, Henry R. Hertzfeld, Peter Hulsroj, Raymond Je-
anloz, Barry Kellman, Al Mauroni, Scott Pace, Victoria Samson, James B. (Bart) Wager Jr., and Brian
Weeden. Staff members at the Georgetown Law Library provided essential support in research, cite
checking, and editing: Mabel Shaw, Jeremy McCabe, Peter Runfola, and Emma Chapman. The author
was previously employed by the U.S. Department of Defense, but the views expressed here do not neces-
sarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department or the U.S. Government.
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Introduction
The world today is wobbling on the precipice of a threatening new arms
race in outer space, a development that would be simultaneously dangerous
and expensive, as well as eminently avoidable. China, Russia, the United
States, and others are conducting an expanded array of tests of anti-satellite
(“ASAT”) weapons and associated capabilities and technologies; fresh fund-
ing is surging into the field; and increasingly bellicose rhetoric emanates
from military and civilian authorities. No shots have yet been fired in anger,
but the exoatmospheric environment is no longer a sanctuary from predatory
arms competition, and unless international legal and political corrective ac-
tion is undertaken promptly, the hazards will surely escalate.
The stakes are already high here, because the United States and other
developed countries have become so heavily dependent upon satellites to
support the full range of civilian and military activities. Denial or serious
degradation of those space functions could be catastrophic, inflicting imme-
diate and possibly irreversible economic, social, and security losses. Indeed,
satellite-enabled services have become so ubiquitous that most people no
longer notice them, remaining passively unaware of how thoroughly our
daily activities, and our responses to military crises, have become reliant
upon a secure, predictable regime of outer space—and how imperiled that
stability has now become.
Worse yet, the world’s traditional mechanisms for responding to emer-
gent security threats have failed here, with the global diplomatic and politi-
cal institutions and routines proving feckless over a period of decades.
Although the early years of the Space Age were remarkably fertile in gener-
ating new treaties and international norms for regulating the safe and pro-
ductive exploitation of space, that process has ground to a halt, and no fresh
concepts have emerged that command the international consensus among
spacefaring states to avoid or mitigate the new dangers.
This Article seeks to circumvent that impasse, by proposing three modest
initiatives for arms control in outer space. None of these schemes is revolu-
tionary or definitive; even in concert, they would not suffice to solve the
security problems generated by revolutionary ASAT developments. But they
can be useful nonetheless in reenergizing the stultified global diplomatic
dialogue, jump-starting a more robust international process.
The three proposals assembled here are: a “no first use” pledge; a limited
test ban agreement; and a mechanism for shared monitoring of outer space.
Importantly, each of these concepts has antecedents elsewhere in arms con-
trol, where they have proven successful both in contributing in a modest,
immediate way to enhanced security and in catalyzing progress toward more
ambitious subsequent measures. Indeed, this is often the way arms control
proceeds: via initial baby steps that can lead to something more profound.
This Article’s essential proposition is to apply that traditional arms-control
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incrementalism to outer space, restoring a process of sensible, measured re-
sponses to urgent security threats.
The Article proceeds as follows. After this Introduction, Part I presents
the current quagmire of outer space in three dimensions. First, it explores
the growing U.S. and global dependence upon space, to make clear how
much we have come to derive economic and military value from orbiting
resources, and accordingly how vulnerable we have become to perturbations
in satellite operations. Second, it describes the threat: the explosion of ASAT
and related counter-space activities, especially by the three leading spacefar-
ing countries but now increasingly emulated by others. The past decade has
“changed the game” regarding space security in alarming ways. Third, it
analyzes the failure of the international law-making institutions to cope
with this new adversity, and it concludes that the existing panorama of dip-
lomatic initiatives is wholly inadequate to suppress the erupting problems.
Next, the Article presents my three proposals. Part II discusses the idea of
an agreement for no first use of ASAT weapons—an undertaking not to be
the first to introduce space warfare into any future combat. Part III displays
the possibilities for a new limited ASAT test ban regime—an agreement to
refrain from explosive testing in space of the most aggravating types of
weapons. Part IV explains the idea of shared “space situational awareness”
(“SSA”)—a commitment to augment countries’ collective abilities to under-
stand what is actually happening in outer space and to respond to distant
events. In each Part, the Article describes what the proposal entails, what
the various options and sub-elements could consist of, and how the idea
would contribute to security. Importantly, each Part also explains the rele-
vant precedents, identifying how the concept has previously played out in
the realms of the control of nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons,
suggesting analogies for outer space.
Finally, the Article offers some concluding thoughts, trying to project
how these initial incremental steps might lead to more ambitious and com-
prehensive measures of arms control in outer space. That sort of more endur-
ing solution is long-distant and hard to conceive at this point, but the
urgency of the problem should energize the world to pursue it vigorously.
I. The Current Quagmire in Outer Space
This Part discusses, in three steps, where the world now stands regarding
the deficit of arms control in outer space, how we got into the current pre-
dicament, and why the usual spectrum of global responses is so inadequate
to deal with the new threats.
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A. The World’s Large and Growing Use of, and Dependence upon, Space
Space is now thoroughly integrated into terrestrial ecosystems, especially
in the United States and other economically advanced societies, but to a
growing degree everywhere. Indeed, satellites have been insinuated into
every aspect of modern life, but sometimes with a subtlety that obscures
their true impact.1
On the civilian side, satellites enable many of the communications
(phone, text, email, internet, television) and banking operations (credit card
purchases, ATMs) that have become the primary modes of social interaction
and the lifeblood of the world’s economy. For industrial purposes,
networked supervisory control and data acquisition (“SCADA”) systems en-
able operators to coordinate peripheral manufacturing and other operations,
and the emerging internet of things will similarly revolutionize consumer
behavior. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) satellites guide and track cars,
airplanes, and, soon, drones that will deliver household packages. Earth-
monitoring spacecraft enable farmers to supervise their crops, foresters to
direct firefighters, and flood control authorities to anticipate river flows.
Satellites help save lives by supporting disaster relief and search and rescue
missions. In each of these functions, the invisible, speed-of-light, and inex-
pensive links must be ubiquitous and 100% reliable—any gaps in coverage
or transitory outages provoke exasperation and confusion, as people seem to
notice the service mechanisms only when they are interrupted.2
The United States is the world’s pre-eminent explorer and exploiter of
commercial and civil space, but a broad array of other countries is fully
invested in satellite operations, and even the impoverished world is racing
1. See generally Elbridge Colby, Ctr. for a New Am. Sec., from Sanctuary to Battlefield: A
Framework for U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space (2016); Theresa Hitchens
& Joan Johnson-Freese, Atlantic Council Strategy, Strategy Paper No. 5, Toward a New
National Security Space Strategy (2016); Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st
Century (2017); 1 Bhavya Lal et al., Inst. for Def. Analyses, IDA Paper P-5242, Global
Trends in Space (2015) [hereinafter IDA]; Bruce W. MacDonald et al., Foreign Policy Inst.,
Crisis Stability in Space: China and Other Challenges (2016); Comm. on Nat’l Sec. Space
Def. & Prot., Nat’l Research Council, National Security Space Defense and Protection
(2016) [hereinafter NRC Report]; Space Security Index (Jessica West ed., 13th ed. 2016); Jack M.
Beard, Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 38 U. Pa.
J. Int’l L. 335 (2017).
2. See MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 5–6; NRC Report, supra note 1, at 3, 10–11, 14, 27–28; R
Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 46–53, 69–80 (surveying wide range of uses of space by various R
actors, and noting growth in global space industry); GPS Allows for Better, Faster Tsunami Warnings,
Homeland Security News Wire (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/
dr20160218-gps-allows-for-better-faster-tsunami-warnings; Angela Fritz, This New Weather Satellite Isn’t
Just Good for the U.S.—It’s Good for the World, Wash. Post (Nov. 19, 2016), https://wapo.st/2FVgqDJ
(highlighting the value of satellites for weather forecasting); U.S.-EU Satellite Data Arrangement Aids in
Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma Efforts, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.state
.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/273826.htm; Rebecca Spyke Keiser, Assoc. Deputy Adm’r for Pol’y Integra-
tion, NASA, A Day Without Space: Economic Security Ramifications (Dec. 9, 2011), https://
www.nasa.gov/pdf/609548main_Space%20Enterprise%20Council% 20Briefing%20Final%20Package
%20Dec%209%20updated.pdf; see also NASA, Spinoff (2017) (collecting dozens of instances of collat-
eral benefits from space operations).
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toward similar market penetration. No fewer than eleven states are now ca-
pable of launching satellites; fifty-nine countries operate their own orbiters,
and every community derives multiple types of benefits from space assets.
The annual global space economy has been estimated as a $340 billion
enterprise.3
On the military side, the degree of exploitation of space is, if anything,
even greater. Today, the U.S. military demands ever-increasing bandwidth
for secure, real-time communications between central authorities and fielded
forces on land, sea, and air. Satellites provide crucial strategic and tactical
reconnaissance about the location and status of enemy and friendly assets
and about after-action battle damage assessment. Other satellites supply the
strategic and tactical warning of enemy ballistic missile launches and cue
anti-missile system responses. The same GPS network that provides the
foundation for Waze and other civilian navigation aids also enables military
aircraft, ships, and trucks to know their locations and plot their courses, and
it steers many “smart bombs” with their characteristic stunning accuracy.
3. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Space Strategy for Europe, COM (2016) 705 final (Oct. 26,
2016) (presenting European Commission views about how space matters for Europe); Dean Cheng,
Heritage Found., Responding to the Chinese Space Challenge (2017); Anthony H.
Cordesman, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, Chinese Space Strategy and Developments 7
(2016) (reporting China’s use of space assets for land resource assessment, environmental quality monitor-
ing, emergency responses, and other functions); IDA, supra note 1, at 2.3–2.6, 3.1–3.14 (noting that R
eighty countries engage in space-based activities and 170 countries hold financial interests in satellites);
NRC Report, supra note 1, at 13, 16–19; Kevin Pollpeter et al., U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. R
Comm’n, China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implica-
tions for the United States 19–22 (2015) (presenting China’s views on space weapons and arms
control); Satellite Indus. Ass’n, State of the Satellite Industry Report 7–8 (2017); Space
Security Index, supra note 1, at 46–50 (noting several countries’ pursuit of satellite-based navigation R
systems, and fifty countries’ investments in Earth observation satellites); id. at 53 (reporting that fifty-six
countries own or operate active satellites); id. at 56–57 (comparing states’ civilian space budgets); id. at
73–74 (noting countries’ efforts to grow their commercial space sectors); Justin Anderson et al., Interna-
tional Space Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and U.S. Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space, 7 Space
& Def. 6, 7–22 (2014) (discussing military space programs of India, Brazil, and South Africa); William
J. Lynn, III, A Military Strategy for the New Space Environment, 34 Wash. Q. 7, 8 (2011) (reporting that
eleven states now operate twenty-two launch sites, and more than sixty nations have a presence in space);
Daniel Stacey, India Looks for Its Own Elon Musk to Win the Space Race with China, Wall St. J. (June 23,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-shoots-for-the-moon-chasing-influence-closer-to-home-
1498210205 (reporting that India plans to spend over $6 billion on its space program over the next five
years); Michael Raska, The Real Star Wars: Improving Satellite Defences (Rajaratnam Sch. Of Int’l Studies,
Working Paper No. CO16032, 2016), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CO16032
.pdf (reporting that sixty-seven percent of the economy of the United Kingdom is dependent on space-
based communications, and that $1.6 trillion of U.S. business revenues in 2015 were heavily influenced
by satellites); Tristan Kenderdine, Coordinating China’s Satellite Constellations, Asia & Pac. Pol’y Soc.
(July 20, 2017), https://www.policyforum.net/coordinating-chinas-satellite-constellations/ (discussing
the role of space assets in China’s Belt and Road Project); David Martin, The Battle Above (CBS News 60
Minutes broadcast Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/rare-look-at-space-command-satellite-
defense-60-minutes-2/; UCS Satellite Database, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa
.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WX91SoTyuos (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
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Satellites provide current and forecasted weather data, essential for military
and civilian operations alike.4
To date, other countries remain a step or two behind the United States in
the integration of space into military operations, but many of them are com-
mitted to following the same trajectory, to exploit the manifest war-fighting
benefits of space.5
4. See Colby, supra note 1, at 4–5, 8 (surveying the “[v]ital [i]mportance of [s]pace to the United R
States” and concluding that “[t]he United States has therefore built an enormously expensive and deli-
cate architecture of space assets upon which it greatly relies for its military preeminence—and left it
increasingly vulnerable to adversary attack or disablement”); MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 5–6; R
NRC Report, supra note 1, at 3, 19–21; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 80–85 (surveying the R
range of space-based U.S. military force enhancements); Beard, supra note 1, at 337–39; Lynn, supra note R
3, at 7, 10 (then-Deputy Secretary of Defense asserting, “Space systems enable our modern way of war. R
They allow our warfighters to strike with precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with
certainty, and to see the battlefield with clarity. Without them, many of our most important military
advantages evaporate . . . . [T]oday we rely on space for almost everything we do”); Martin, supra note 3 R
(citing a budget of $25 billion per year for U.S. military and intelligence space programs); Michael
Nayak, CubeSat Proximity Operations: The Natural Evolution of Defensive Space Control into a Deterrence Initia-
tive, Space Rev. (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2902/1 (citing William
Shelton, then the Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, asserting, “From satellite-based
surveillance to communications, mapping and weather technologies . . . every US military action depends
on space capabilities”).
5. See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 115th Congress 8–9 (2017) (opening statement of Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence)
(forecasting that Russia will double or triple the number of its satellites by 2025, “China intends to
continue increasing its space-based military and intelligence capabilities,” and both countries “will con-
tinue to pursue a full range of [anti-satellite (“ASAT”)] weapons as a means to reduce US military
effectiveness”); Cordesman, supra note 3, at 5, 8–9, 13–19 (discussing China’s reliance upon satellites R
for a wide range of military applications); Eric Heginbotham et al., Rand Corp., The U.S.-China
Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, at
228–32 (2015) (comparing U.S. and Chinese use of military space systems); Steve Lambakis, Nat’l
Inst. Pub. Pol’y, Foreign Space Capabilities 9–15 (2017) (comparing U.S. and other military satel-
lite systems); Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 8 (reporting Chinese military statements that “whoever R
controls space controls the Earth”), 73–86 (describing China’s military space programs); Space Security
Index, supra note 1, at 80–83, 87–90 (discussing use of military satellites by the United States, Russia, R
China, India, the European Union, and others). Regarding Russia’s military space programs, see U.S.
Def. Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power 35–37 (2017) [hereinafter DIA] (describing
Russia’s space and counter-space military capabilities, including more than 130 spacecraft); U.S.-China
Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 2015 Report to Congress 281, 283 (2015) (concluding that “Beijing
believes space superiority would be critical to almost every component of its military operations . . . .”).
Regarding China’s military space programs, see Cassandra Steer, Global Commons, Cosmic Commons: Impli-
cations of Military and Security Uses of Outer Space, 18 Geo. J. Int’l Aff. 9 (2017); David Axe, Russia Is
Using Space Power in Its Attack on Syria, Daily Beast (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www
.thedailybeast.com/russia-is-using-space-power-in-its-attack-on-syria (observing that Russia claims to
have positioned ten satellites over Syria to support its military operations); Ruth Eglash & William
Booth, Israel to Launch One of the Most Advanced Missile Defense Systems in the World, With U.S. Help, Wash.
Post (Mar. 3, 2016), http://wapo.st/2prlpG5 (asserting that Israel’s defense system will be able to hit
orbiting satellites as well as ballistic missiles); Clay Dillow, Is China’s Race to Space a Military Ploy?,
CNBC (Feb. 18, 2016, 9:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/18/chinas-space-missions-in-2016-
tied-to-military-ambitions.html (estimating China’s space program as spending two to three billion
dollars per year, but still being decades behind the U.S. program). Regarding other countries’ military
space programs, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Kick-Starts Military Satellite Programs, Def. News
(June 19, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/space/2017/06/19/india-kick-starts-military-satellite-pro
grams/ (discussing India’s surging space and ASAT programs); S. Korea’s Military Seeks Five Indigenous Spy
Satellites by 2023, Yonhap News Agency (Aug. 25, 2017, 3:00PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/
news/2017/08/25/0200000000AEN20170825007300315.html. See also Anderson et al., supra note 3. R
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Therefore, it is impossible to overestimate the role of space in modern life;
the benefits from satellites are multiple and diverse and will surely continue
to expand in the coming years. But there is also a dark side to this phenome-
nally successful exploitation. That is, as countries pour more functions into
satellites, they have simultaneously reduced some of their capacities for per-
forming some of those operations in the “old fashioned” way; the alternative
routines have atrophied. Collectively, we have declined to sustain all of the
now-redundant, less-efficient systems of land lines, postal services, and paper
maps; in the same vein, it now seems quaintly anachronistic to train naval
officers and civilian ship captains to discern their position via sextant, when
all-weather GPS devices are so much quicker and more accurate.6
Over time, therefore, the modern “use” of satellites has evolved into a
“reliance” upon them, which has graduated into a “dependence,” and even-
tually generated a “vulnerability.” Potential adversaries, aware of the tech-
nology patterns of the United States (and other), have come to appreciate the
suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles heel of the American
civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus. If deft ASAT operations
could deprive the United States of its space services, an attacker might be
able to swiftly obtain a crippling advantage.7
Even in that apocalyptic scenario, the United States would not be de-
stroyed or disarmed—an immensely powerful fighting force and a robust
infrastructure would still be largely intact. But the ability to fight effec-
tively, in the manner that the military has now been trained to prosecute,
6. But see Colby, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing Department of Defense efforts to reduce reliance upon R
GPS and other space assets); Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 98 (reporting that in 2015, the R
U.S. Navy resumed training in the use of sextants for celestial navigation, in response to the vulnerability
of GPS signals); Josh Hrala, The Scary, Practical Reason the US Navy Is Once Again Teaching Celestial Naviga-
tion, Sci. Alert (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.sciencealert.com/the-scary-practical-reason-the-navy-is-
once-again-teaching-celestial-navigation (citing Thomas Gibbons-Neff, After Two Decades, Sailing by the
Stars Is Back at the Naval Academy, Wash. Post (Oct. 13, 2015), http://wapo.st/2DGq1Mt); Jonathan
Saul, Cyber Threats Prompt Return of Radio for Ship Navigation, Reuters (Aug. 9, 2017, 2:38AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping-gps-cyber/cyber-threats-prompt-return-of-radio-for-ship-naviga
tion-idUSKBN1AN0HT.
7. Nayak, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that foreign policy analysts cite the U.S. dependence upon space R
as an “Achilles heel,” and quoting one Chinese analyst referring to it as America’s “soft ribs,” saying
“for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes,
attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice”); see Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 114th Cong. 9 (2016) (state-
ment of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence) (“Foreign military leaders understand the unique
advantages that space-based systems provide to the United States. Russia [sic] senior leadership probably
views countering the US space advantage as a critical component of warfighting.”); Andrew H. Boyd,
Satellite and Ground Communication Systems: Space and Electronic Warfare Threats to the United States Army,
Land Warfare Papers, Nov. 2017, at 1 (“One of the U.S. Army’s most critical vulnerabilities is its
overreliance on SATCOM, on which most of its mission command systems depend.”); see also MacDon-
ald et al., supra note 1, at 7 (“It is no wonder that China’s [military] wants the capability to interrupt R
the rivers of information and services that U.S. space assets provide.”); Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at R
8, 109–11 (discussing how China’s growing counter-space capabilities pose a threat to the U.S. military);
Alessandro Shimabukuro, No Deal in Space: A Bargaining Model Analysis of U.S. Resistance to Space Arms
Control, 30 Space Pol’y 13, 14 (2014) (reporting that the vulnerability of U.S. satellite systems has
inspired fears of a “Space Pearl Harbor”).
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would be compromised, and an economy that has grown accustomed to in-
stantaneous communications and choreographed just-in-time delivery and
payment would find it very difficult to adapt to circumstances that were
routine not that long ago. If deprived of its space assets, the U.S. military
might be reduced to fighting as it did in the pre-digital era; the American
firepower in the 1950s and 1960s was surely staggering, but it would pale
in comparison to what the Pentagon has created in recent decades.8
That growing (or, now, full-grown) U.S. investment in satellites, and the
understanding that “a day without space” would be a very bad day, indeed,
have perversely reinforced the strong incentives for potential enemies to pur-
sue counter-space capabilities. There is a measure of reciprocity in this rela-
tionship, as China, Russia, and others also deploy their own satellites,
treading the same path toward reliance, dependence, and vulnerability. The
same pressures and incentives that have driven the United States to place
valuable assets into space will doubtless inspire others to make some similar
choices. But for at least the next decade, and perhaps beyond, a major asym-
metry remains: the United States is much more highly invested in space,
both in the sheer number of military and civilian satellites and in the diver-
sity and ubiquity of their uses.9
In sum, all states share an interest in a sustainable, peaceful, and un-
threatened regime for space, but some countries, especially the United
States, share it more.
8. Martin, supra note 3 (quoting Gen. John Hyten, then the head of Air Force Space Command, R
saying that without space assets, “What happens is you go back to World War II. You go back to
industrial age warfare”); see James A. Lewis, Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace, in Anti-
Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino–American Space Relations 61, 66 (Michael Krepon
& Julia Thompson eds., 2013) (explaining that, unlike nuclear weapons, space weapons do not pose an
“existential” threat to the United States, but they nonetheless pose significant problems for deterrence);
Jeffry Lin & P.W. Singer, China to Launch Powerful Hyperspectral Satellite, Popular Sci. (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.popsci.com/china-to-launch-worlds-most-powerful-hyperspectral-satellite#page-2; David
Logsdon et al., Roundtable Discussion, A Day without Space: Economic and National Security Ramifica-
tions (Oct. 16, 2008), http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Day-without-Space-Oct-16-2008
.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170817161004/http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Day-without-Space-Oct-16-2008.pdf]. But see Gregory Kulacki, The United States, China, and Anti-Satel-
lite Weapons, All Things Nuclear Blog (Sept. 7, 2016, 9:47 AM), http://allthingsnuclear.org/gku-
lacki/the-united-states-china-and-anti-satellite-weapons (“China’s military dependence on satellites may
be greater than that of the United States.”). See generally Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 96–99. R
9. See Heginbotham et al., supra note 5, at 228–32 (comparing U.S. and Chinese orbital infrastruc- R
tures); Lambakis, supra note 5, at 1–2 (stressing U.S. military reliance upon space assets); Bruce W. R
MacDonald, Council on Foreign Relations, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security 3–4
(2008); Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 116 (forecasting that if current trends continue, China will R
have as much to lose as it has to gain from the management or mismanagement of space); Space Secur-
ity Index, supra note 1, at 80–82, 87–89 (comparing U.S., Chinese, Russian, and other military space R
programs, including those in Iran, North Korea, India, Japan, and the European Union); Brian Chow,
Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat, Strategic Stud. Q., Summer 2017, at 82; Shimabukuro, supra
note 7, at 15, 17 (presenting charts comparing U.S. and Chinese satellite numbers). But see MacDonald R
et al., supra note 1, at 7, 16, 20 (forecasting that the absolute U.S. advantages in space will increase over R
time, but the margin of U.S. advantage seems likely to diminish); Michael Nacht, The United States and
China in Space, in Anti-Satellite Weapons, supra note 8, at 101, 103. R
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B. The Incipient Arms Race in Space
Humans have demonstrated remarkable creativity and persistence in de-
veloping a plethora of space weapons. For purposes of this Article, the full
array of counter-space or space-control activities and apparatus is under eval-
uation. The technology (as developed, tested, and deployed, or at least as
conceptualized) includes kinetic-energy interceptors (developing a physical
mass of some sort to be sent into space, to collide with a target or to explode
nearby, shattering both vehicles); directed-energy systems (exploring the use
of high energy lasers, microwave systems, or other concepts, to burn holes in
targeted satellites, blind their sensors, or otherwise damage or destroy
them); or cyber mechanisms (inventing capabilities to interfere with uplinks
and downlinks, to disrupt the space vehicle’s normal functions, or even to
commandeer it).10 Critical elements of these systems could be based on
Earth, on aircraft, or on satellites. Moreover, an attacker contemplating a
challenge to a rival’s space system could elect to target whatever appeared to
be the weakest, most vulnerable component: the satellite itself, the ground
station that controls and communicates with it, or the electronic or other
links between them.
With all those variables, it is not surprising that the world has seen arms
races in space before, but what is surprising is that we have always managed
to avoid the worst, most expensive, and most destabilizing versions. In fact,
the history of ASAT weaponry is virtually as old as the history of satellites—
both the United States and the Soviet Union began exploring mechanisms
for attacking enemy orbiters in the 1950s and 1960s.11 By the 1970s and
10. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 99–104 (discussing a variety of mechanisms for attack- R
ing satellites); Martin, supra note 3; see Heginbotham et al., supra note 5, at 237–41 (analyzing the R
risks that U.S. counter-space programs could pose for China); Todd Harrison et al., Ctr. for Stra-
tegic & Int’l Studies, Implications of Ultra-Low-Cost Access to Space; Air Univ., Maxwell
Air Force Base, Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra Low-Cost Space Access for 21st Century
Challenges 10–18 (2017); Stephen Shea et al., Terror on High: Deterring ASAT, Space & Def., Spring
2015, at 59, 60–63 (discussing alternative mechanisms for attacking satellites); Mike Gruss, DoD Will
Spend $2 Billion on Space Control This Year, Space News (Mar. 23, 2016), http://spacenews.com/dod-will-
spend-2-billion-on-space-control-this-year/; Patricia Lewis & David Livingstone, The Cyber Threat in Outer
Space, Bull. Atomic Scientists (Nov. 21, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/cyber-threat-outer-space101
78; Jana Robinson, Governance Challenges at the Intersection of Space and Cyber Security, Space Rev. (Feb. 15,
2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2923/1 (emphasizing the conjunction of space and cyber
security); Christopher Stone, Rethinking the National Security Space Strategy: Part 3, Space Rev. (Feb. 8,
2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2918/1.
11. See Brian Weeden, Secure World Found., Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, Ameri-
can, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space 20–23, 29–30 (2014); Michael Krepon & Sonya
Schoenberger, Stimson Ctr., A Comparison of Nuclear and Anti-Satellite Testing, 1945–2013, in Anti-Sat-
ellite Weapons, supra note 8, at 131–37; John Pike & Eric Stambler, Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms R
Control, in 2 Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament 991, 992–94 (Richard Dean Burns
ed., 1993); Steven Weber & Sidney Drell, Attempts to Regulate Military Activities in Space, in U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons 373, 378–88 (Alexander George et al.
eds., 1988); Bart Hendrickx, Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet, 69 Space Chron. 1 (2016);
Anatoly Zak, The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer, Popular Mechanics (Nov. 1, 2013) [herein-
after Zak, Hidden History], http://www.popularmechanics.com/space/satellites/a9620/the-hidden-history-
of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970/; Anatoly Zak, Spacecraft: Military: IS Anti-Satellite System, Rus-
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1980s, each superpower had thoroughly tested and evaluated multiple con-
cepts, and each had deployed an ASAT weapon with “operational” status.12
The principal U.S. enterprise employed a guided missile to be launched into
space by a rapidly-ascending F-15 Eagle fighter jet; it was successfully tested
in 1985 against a defunct Solwind satellite, spectacularly obliterating the
target.13
However, a remarkable hiatus then followed, as both countries refrained
from further overt ASAT-test operations. No treaty required this restraint;
there was not even an explicit non-legally-binding agreement on unilateral
moratoria. But the next two decades were relatively free of salient ASAT
developments, as each side seemingly assessed that further acceleration in
that direction was contrary to its interests.14 A common refrain was that
space had been “militarized, but not weaponized,” meaning that multiple
military operations were conducted through satellites, but that no weapons
(capable of attacking satellites or targets on Earth) had yet been operation-
ally deployed into space.15
That complacency was rudely shattered in 2007, when China dramatically
entered the ASAT testing business. Beijing authorities launched an SC-19
interceptor aboard a multi-stage solid-fuel missile from the Xichang Satel-
sian Space Web (Dec. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Zak, Spacecraft], http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html.
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130115035516/http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html]. See generally
Laura Grego, Union of Concerned Scientists, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (2012);
Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984, at 47–58, 106–34 (1985);
Michael Krepon, Opinion, Is Space Warfare’s Final Frontier?, Space News (July 24, 2017), http://
spacenews.com/op-ed-is-space-warfares-final-frontier/ (assessing that today the world is entering its third
round of intensified military competition in space).
12. Stares, supra note 11, at 135–56, 201–15; see Grego, supra note 11, at 3–5; NRC Report, supra R
note 1, at 9; Weeden, supra note 11, at 22–23, 29–31; Hendrickx, supra note 11; Weber & Drell, supra R
note 11, at 388–424; Zak, Hidden History, supra note 11; Zak, Spacecraft, supra note 11. R
13. Weeden, supra note 11, at 25; see Todd Harrison et al., Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., R
Escalation and Deterrence in the Second Space Age 2–4 (2017); Pike & Stambler, supra note
11, at 993–94. R
14. David Axe, When It Comes to War in Space, U.S. Has the Edge, Reuters (Aug. 10, 2015), http://
blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/ (charac-
terizing the era as an “unofficial moratorium” against weapons in space); see Grego, supra note 11, at R
5–8; Pike & Stambler, supra note 11, at 991–92. This period was not entirely free from weapons-related R
developments in space. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive triggered fears of a “Star Wars” program for weaponization of space, and in 1997, the United States
tested its MIRACL laser as an anti-satellite weapon. The United States also developed its Counter Com-
munications System, a non-destructive ASAT device. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 100; R
Weeden, supra note 11, at 25. See generally Hendrickx, supra note 11. China also developed a ground- R
based laser capable of temporarily dazzling U.S. satellites. Heginbotham et al., supra note 5, at R
246–48; NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. Spacecraft, Space News (Oct. 3, 2006), http://
spacenews.com/nro-confirms-chinese-laser-test-illuminated-us-spacecraft/.
15. See A. Ferreira-Snyman, Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, with
Specific Reference to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, 18 Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad
[PER] 488, 499–501 (2015), http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v18n3/03.pdf (differentiating between
militarization and weaponization of space); Shimabukuro, supra note 7, at 14; Jinyuan Su, The “Peaceful R
Purposes” Principle in Outer Space and the Russia-China PPWT Proposal, 26 Space Pol’y 81, 83 (2010);
Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space, in Handbook of Space Law 331,
333–34 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015); see also Heginbotham et al., supra note 5, at 248–49. R
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lite Launch Center in Sichuan Province; it collided with a defunct FY-1C
satellite at an altitude of 865 kilometers, shattering both spacecrafts. The
resulting plume of fragments—over 3000 pieces large enough to be tracked
from Earth (and large enough to pose a substantial hazard to other satel-
lites)—is expected to remain aloft for decades as the single worst debris-
creating incident in space history.16
The next year, the United States responded, shooting down one of its own
failing satellites, in Operation Burnt Frost. There, the U.S.S. Lake Erie, a
Navy guided missile cruiser, launched a Standard Missile-3, part of the Ae-
gis Ballistic Missile Defense System, to ram into a non-functional National
Reconnaissance Office satellite designated as USA-193 at 240 kilometers
altitude several hundred miles northwest of Hawaii. Because of the lower
altitude, the debris from this event fell back to Earth relatively quickly,
posing much less hazard to space navigation—but nonetheless demonstrat-
ing the U.S. capability for neutralizing satellites.17
If those events served as a “wake-up call” about the renewal of ASAT
activity, the alarms continued to sound (albeit without the concussive effect
of satellite destructions) in the following years. China, for example, contin-
ued to test space interceptors, but without causing catastrophic collisions by
targeting an ascending vehicle against an unoccupied pre-designated point
in space or by gently “bumping” a target spacecraft at low relative speed. In
2010, 2013, and 2014, China conducted delicate maneuvers involving mul-
tiple satellite close approaches and a robotic arm, activities with both benign
and weapons applications. Most vividly, in 2013, China ominously launched
a similar experimental rocket to much higher altitude, almost reaching the
special geosynchronous orbit at 36,000 km, at which many of the most valu-
able reconnaissance and communications satellites are parked.18
16. See also Martin, supra note 3. See generally Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 86–93; Space R
Security Index, supra note 1, at 100 (noting that China had conducted two earlier ASAT tests in 2005 R
and 2006, which did not result in collisions and the creation of debris); Weeden, supra note 11, at 1–19; R
Gregory Kulacki & Jeffrey G. Lewis, Understanding China’s Antisatellite Test, 15 Nonproliferation
Rev. 335 (2008); T.S. Kelso, Ctr. Space Standards & Innovation, Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test
and the Impact of Its Debris on the Space Environment, 2007 Proc. Advanced Maui Optical & Space
Surveillance Tech. Conf.
17. Weeden, supra note 11, at 25–29. See generally USA-193: Selected Documents (P.J. Blount & R
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds., 2009); David Axe, When It Comes to War in Space, U.S. Has the Edge,
Reuters (Aug. 10, 2015) (asserting that the United States now deploys dozens of comparable missiles,
capable of quickly wiping out Russian and Chinese satellites); Bhupendra Jasani, King’s Coll. London,
Space Assets and Emerging Threats 10–11, Presentation at the 10th United Nations Workshop on Space
Law (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/SLW2016/Panel2/1_Jasani_-_Space_assets_and_threats
_06082016.pdf (summarizing U.S. ASAT programs).
18. See Coats, supra note 5, at 9 (assessing that China’s ground-based ASAT missile system “might be R
nearing operational service”); Cordesman, supra note 3, at 22–27; Lambakis, supra note 5, at 19–26 R
(describing China’s space modernization programs); Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 89–91; U.S.- R
China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, supra note 5, at 292–98; Weeden, supra note 11, at 12–13; R
Maximilian Betmann, A Counterspace Awakening? (Part I), Space Rev. (May 22, 2017), http://www.thes-
pacereview.com/article/3247/1; Harsh Vasani, How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space, Diplomat (Jan. 19,
2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/; Brian Weeden, Danc-
ing in the Dark Redux: Recent Russian Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in Space, Space Rev. (Oct. 5,
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Russia undertook a series of four launches in 2013 and 2014 that deliv-
ered maneuverable spacecraft into orbit, conducting covert “rendezvous and
proximity operations” (“RPO”), testing the ability to execute deft ap-
proaches to other orbiters and employing a robotic arm. Similar, still-myste-
rious events in 2015 involved repeated, slow close approaches to targeted
spacecraft, validating capabilities for inspection, servicing, or attack. Again
in 2016, Russia conducted non-destructive interception tests in space. Rus-
sian officials have been ambiguous about their intentions, sometimes ascrib-
ing these events to anti-missile programs, but sometimes overtly
acknowledging a dedicated ASAT-development enterprise.19
In each instance, the nature and motivation of these test flights remain
obscure—in space, many of the techniques and much of the hardware are
inherently dual-capable, adaptable for both benign scientific research and
weapons applications. Even within the military sector, it is difficult for
outside observers to discern whether a particular space enterprise is devoted
to anti-satellite functions or to the refinement of an ability to defend against
incoming ballistic missiles and warheads.20
Thus inspired (or panicked), U.S. space officials have responded with re-
newed concern about the safety of U.S. space assets, and they have redoubled
their attention to corrective or offsetting actions. The Obama administration
hurriedly added an extra $5 billion to the Pentagon budget for unspecified
space security enhancements and undertook to assess how best to protect the
2015), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/1. Also note reports that in 2006, a Chinese laser
“dazzled” a U.S. satellite, resulting in temporary degradation of its functionality. U.S.-China Econ. &
Sec. Rev. Comm’n, supra note 5, at 298; China Jamming Test Sparks U.S. Satellite Concerns, Reuters, Oct. R
5, 2006, Factiva, Doc. No. LBA0000020061005e2a5001v0; NRO Confirms, supra note 14. See generally R
Chow, supra note 9; Martin, supra note 3. R
19. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 103–04, 106–07; Betmann, supra note 18; Weeden, R
supra note 18; Martin, supra note 3. See generally Coats, supra note 5, at 9 (summarizing Russian tests and R
statements regarding ASAT developments); Lambakis, supra note 5, at 26–31 (describing Russia’s grow- R
ing investment in space and counter-space capabilities); Hendrickx, supra note 11; Bill Gertz, Russia R
Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile, Wash. Free Beacon (May 27, 2016), http://freebeacon.com/national-
security/russia-flight-tests-anti-satellite-missile/; George Leopold, Russian Test Reported, But Was It
ASAT?, Def. Systems (Dec. 22, 2016), https://defensesystems.com/articles/2016/12/22/russian.aspx; L.
Todd Wood, Russia Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, Wash. Times (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.washington-
times.com/news/2016/dec/21/russia-tests-anti-satellite-weapon-pl-19-nudol/.
20. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 99, 103, 105; Weber & Drell, supra note 11, at 418 R
(observing that missile defense and ASAT “are intimately connected in both a technological and mili-
tary-strategic sense”); Weeden, supra note 11, at 34–35; Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifia- R
ble Limited Test Ban for Anti-Satellite Weapons, Wash. Q., July 2010, at 155–56 (comparing missile
defense tests and ASAT tests); Mark A. Gubrud, Chinese and U.S. Kinetic Energy Space Weapons and Arms
Control, 35 Asian Persps. 617, (2011) [hereinafter Gubrud, Chinese and U.S.]; Mark A. Gubrud, An
“ASAT Test Ban” Is Not Arms Control, 1.0 Human (Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Gubrud, Not Arms
Control], http://gubrud.net/?p=355; Vasani, supra note 18 (characterizing the difference between ASAT R
and missile defense tests as depending mainly on software variations); see also Mike Gruss, Russian Satellite
Maneuvers, Silence Worry Intelsat, Space News (Oct. 9, 2015), http://spacenews.com/russian-satellite-ma-
neuvers-silence-worry-intelsat/ (describing worried U.S. reaction to Russian satellite that maneuvered
close to U.S. geosynchronous satellites without explanation). See generally James A. Vedda & Peter L.
Hays, Major Policy Issues in Evolving Global Space Operations, Mitchell Inst. Pol’y Papers, Dec. 2017, at
24–28.
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U.S. satellite architecture from surging threats.21 The United States
launched two new observation satellites into geosynchronous orbits as sen-
tinels against malicious activity,22 and it continued testing the mysterious
X-37B space plane, which could be capable of a plethora of dual-purpose
operations.23 Some of the new funding has also been devoted to frankly of-
fensive space control activities, about which less has been made public.24
Leaders in each of the three protagonist states have spoken with increased
frankness about the prospect of a new arms race in space.25 From the United
21. See Colby, supra note 1 (citing “a noticeably more alarmed tone” inside the U.S. government R
concerning threats in space); Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 3; Johnson-Freese, supra R
note 1, at 92–96; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 85–86, 97–98 (U.S. officials added $5 billion R
to the budget for space protection activities over the next five years, and an additional $6 billion for space
surveillance through 2020); Weeden, supra note 11, at 39–40; Beard, supra note 1, at 338; Betmann, R
supra note 18 (quoting Sen. John McCain referring to a “counterspace awakening”); Amy Butler, No R
Sanctuary, Aviation Wk. & Space Tech., May 15, 2015, at 68; Martin, supra note 3. R
22. See Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space Activi-
ties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. 5–6 (Mar.
15, 2016) (statement of Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) (discussing “strategic
portfolio review” of 2014 to assess U.S. space systems); Weeden, supra note 18 (noting that the United R
States had also launched two other observation satellites into geosynchronous orbit in 2014, ahead of
their original schedule); Martin, supra note 3. R
23. See Brian Weeden, Secure World Found., X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Fact Sheet
(2017), https://swfound.org/media/205879/swf_x-37b_otv_fact_sheet.pdf; Beard, supra note 1, at R
338–39; Brian Weeden, U.S.-China Cooperation in Space, in Anti-Satellite Weapons, supra note 8, at R
113, 115–16; Martin, supra note 3. R
24. See Reappointment of John E. Hyten To The Grade Of General And To Be Commander, United States
Strategic Command: Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 114th Congress 17 (2016) (answers to advance
questions for General John E. Hyten, USAF) (emphasizing a new emphasis on space control, battle
management, and a “change [in] the warfighting culture of our space cadre”); U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
Directive No. 3100.10, Space Policy (2016); Heginbotham et al., supra note 5, at 234–37 (survey- R
ing U.S. dedicated counter-space systems); Lambakis, supra note 5, at 49–51 (discussing recent U.S. R
space control initiatives); Mike Gruss, Hyten Tells Senate DoD Needs to Focus on Space Control, Battle Manage-
ment System, Space News (Sept. 20, 2016), http://spacenews.com/hyten-tells-senate-dod-needs-to-focus-
on-space-control-battle-management-system/ (highlighting the $2 billion to be spent on space control
capabilities, including $144 million for the Counter Communications System and $158 million for the
Space Security and Defense Program, which is thought to include offensive space capabilities). Much of
the new funding has been devoted to the Counter Communications System, a ground-based mechanism
for jamming or otherwise interfering with communications satellites. See U.S. Air Force, RDT&E
Budget Item Justification, Exhibit R-2, PB 2017 (2016); U.S. Air Force, RDT&E Budget Item
Justification, Exhibit R-2, FY 2018 (2017).
25. See U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, China’s Position on a Code of Conduct in
Space (2017); Cordesman, supra note 3, at 4 (quoting a Chinese leader as saying that space is the “new R
commanding height for international strategic competition . . . [and] means having control of the
ground, oceans, and the electromagnetic space, which also means having the strategic initiative in one’s
hands”); Lambakis, supra note 5, at 29 (quoting Russian officials recommending resumption of efforts to R
“intercept absolutely everything that flies from space”); MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 17, 25 R
(quoting the commander of China’s Air Force as saying that military operations in space are a “historical
inevitability” and asserting that recent Chinese analysis concludes that “the superior military space
power will enjoy decisive benefits”); Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 15–17 (reporting Chinese rheto- R
ric about space control); Walt Conrad et al., Arms Control in the Third Space Age: Assessing International
Efforts to Regulate Military Operations in Outer Space in the “3 C’s” Era, 6 Space & Def. 4, 8 (2017)
(quoting Russian Deputy Defense Minister commenting on other countries’ ASAT developments and
stating that “we can’t sit back and quietly watch others doing that; such work is [also] being conducted
in Russia”); Shimabukuro, supra note 7, at 17 (quoting a Chinese analyst asserting that China “no longer R
wishes to leave the U.S. unchallenged in the use of space in any potential conflict or war in the Taiwan
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States, much of the rhetoric sounds in inevitability and “normalization”—
depicting space as just another military operational environment, akin to
land, sea, and air, in which armed competition is to be expected sooner or
later. From that viewpoint, a prudent defense must anticipate hostilities
from all azimuths and prepare to respond to (or to anticipate) an adversary’s
pursuit of the special advantages of operating in the “new high ground.”26
Other states, too, are expressing new interest in military operations in
space, including pursuit of ASAT capabilities. They—including Russia and
China—may feel that they are not “starting” a new arms race but are merely
attempting belatedly to follow the space weaponization lead pioneered by
the United States.27
Straits, nor in any other conflict it may become involved in”); Zak, Hidden History, supra note 11. But see R
Joan Johnson-Freese & Theresa Hitchens, Stop the Fearmongering Over War in Space: The Sky’s Not Falling,
Part 1, Breaking Def. (Dec. 27, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-
fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/ (arguing that the inflated rhetoric over-
hypes the dangers).
26. See United States Strategic Command: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong. 10
(Apr. 4, 2017) (statement of John E. Hyten, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command) (“Space is a
warfighting domain just like the air, ground, maritime, and cyber domains . . . . [W]e must normalize
how we think of space, how we operate in it, and how we describe it to each other. It is unique for many
reasons, but the concepts that govern other military operations . . . apply just the same.”); Space Secur-
ity Index, supra note 1, at 106 (noting that the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 R
called upon the Department of Defense to have the capability to, “if necessary, deny adversaries the use of
space capabilities”); U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 24; Michael Krepon, Space and Nuclear Deterrence, in R
Anti-Satellite Weapons, supra note 8, at 15, 35–36; Heather Wilson, Why I’m Directing the Air Force R
to Focus on Space, Def. One (June 16, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/06/why-im-di-
recting-air-force-focus-space/138744/ (Secretary of the Air Force asserting that “we must develop space
airmen who have the tools, training, and resources to fight when—not if—war extends into space”); U.S.
Air Force, AFNow The Future of Space, YouTube (June 16, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hyuqdDwdoXM (“Should a war extend into space, the Air Force will lead the debate on how
to normalize space as a warfighting domain.”).
27. See, e.g., Cordesman, supra note 3, at 27 (concluding that “China’s pursuit of advanced capabili- R
ties is an attempt to replicate the space infrastructure the United States has already built”); DIA, supra
note 5, at 36–37 (describing Russia’s counter-space efforts); Grego, supra note 11, at 9–12; Hitchens R
& Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 25–26; Lambakis, supra note 5, at 18–19, 31–35 (discussing space R
and counter-space programs of Iran and North Korea); MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 17–19 R
(noting that China sees itself as inferior to, and under threat from, the space capabilities of the United
States); Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 87, 100; Weeden, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that R
“ASAT [missile] systems are proliferating around the world”); Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 9–11 R
(discussing India’s pursuit of ASAT capability); Axe, supra note 5; Lynn, supra note 3, at 10–11 R
(“Counterspace weapons are no longer the weapon of last resort in a geo-strategic conflict. Instead, they
are becoming tools that advanced nations and sub-regional powers alike are incorporating into conven-
tional military doctrine. Even non-state actors have found utility in employing jammers and manipulat-
ing communications satellites.”); Raghuvanshi, supra note 5 (discussing India’s interest in ASAT R
capabilities); Harsh Vasani, India’s Anti-Satellite Weapons, Diplomat (June 14, 2016), https://thediplomat
.com/2016/06/indias-anti-satellite-weapons/; Martin, supra note 3; Weeden, supra note 18 (noting that R
not long ago, “it was primarily the United States that was testing and developing these [ASAT] capabili-
ties years or decades ahead of any potential rivals”). But see Brian Weeden, Insight: Building Stronger U.S.-
China Relations in Space, Secure World Found. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://swfound.org/news/all-news/
2017/02/insight-building-stronger-us-china-relations-in-space (noting that China’s test of a direct-ascent
ASAT system to near geosynchronous altitudes would constitute a new capability that neither the United
States nor Russia has operationalized in the past).
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In any event, the “mantra” of the U.S. space defense community has
come to focus on the “3 Cs”—the description of space as being “congested”
(crammed with an ever-increasing number of operational satellites and un-
controlled debris); “contested” (with more countries initiating military ac-
tivities designed to challenge other states’ abilities to conduct space
operations); and “competitive” (with multiple users crowding into finite
orbital slots and employing scarce radio frequencies for communications). In
this context, if outer space was ever a true “sanctuary,” removed from the
burdens of traditional terrestrial military competition and threat, it is no
longer so privileged, and the prospect looms of a particularly parlous mili-
tary space race.28
Underpinning these dangers is the observation that space is an environ-
ment in which the offense enjoys distinct advantages. That is, the task of
attacking a satellite is technically easier and cheaper than the task of defend-
ing against those onslaughts. Many of the current satellites that constitute
the backbone of the national security space capabilities incorporate numer-
ous inherent vulnerabilities: they are often large and conspicuous, following
known trajectories with little maneuverability, making them “sitting
ducks” for attack. They are expensive and few in number, without backup
inventories of spare replacements that could be rapidly launched to substi-
tute for any damaged in conflict. They are not “hardened” or shielded
against attack, and adding protective cladding would impose weight penal-
ties that could raise costs and degrade performance.29
Future generations of small or micro-satellites might redress many of
these vulnerabilities, and efforts are underway to develop a more resilient
satellite architecture, better able to withstand possible hostilities. Adapta-
tions could include dispersing satellite functions among many, smaller satel-
lites—instead of relying so extensively upon a few exquisite behemoths—
and leveraging the growing space capabilities of the private sector and of
U.S. allies. Learning, or relearning, how to fight without access to the full
28. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confi-
dence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/68/189* (July 29, 2013) (adopting the
phrase that space is increasingly “congested, contested, and competitive”); U.S. Dep’t of Def. & U.S.
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy, Unclassified Summary 1–3
(2011); Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 15–23; Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at R
26–55 (analyzing the content of the terms “congested, contested, and competitive”); MacDonald et
al., supra note 1, at 10–13; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 28–30 (discussing congestion of R
radio frequencies and orbital slots); Lynn, supra note 3, at 8–14. R
29. See Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. Armed Services Comm., supra note 22, at 7 (observing that R
offense is cheaper than defense in space); Colby, supra note 1, at 7–8, 11 (opining that the U.S. satellite R
architecture is delicate and fragile because it was not designed with military threats in mind, and accord-
ingly, in space, “the job of attackers is, generally speaking, going to be easier than the defender’s, and
considerably less expensive.”); MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 15, 36 (“Space is largely an offense- R
dominant domain.”); NRC Report, supra note 1, at 23–24; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at R
91–94 (vulnerability of satellite communications); Martin, supra note 3. But see Edward Ferguson & John R
Klein, The Future of War in Space is Defensive, Space Rev. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.thespacereview
.com/article/3131/1 (arguing that defensive measures in space can be effective).
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suite of satellite services, such as by reinvesting in some old-fashioned terres-
trial alternatives, is part of the emerging picture, too. The newfound goal is
to create a more responsive and diverse structure, capable of persistence and
reconstitution in the event of an attack—one that could fail gracefully,
rather than catastrophically, when things go wrong. But for now—and until
the United States and others are able to reconfigure their satellite portfo-
lios—space is a realm in which the potential offense remains dominant.30
One possible U.S. response to these emerging provocations, therefore,
would be mimicry: creating or enhancing ASAT systems of its own, match-
ing or exceeding whatever advances Russia and China can accomplish. As
noted above, there could be multiple venues for this extraterrestrial compe-
tition, including kinetic, directed-energy, cyber, and other technologies,
with components based on Earth, in the air, or in space. Proliferating such
weaponry might create a deterrence relationship in space, perhaps akin to
the uneasy interplay of offsetting threats and counter-threats that (some-
times) constrains inter-state violence on Earth. Each side would know that if
it initiated anti-satellite attacks, it would suffer corresponding harm to its
own orbiters, and each might be definitively reluctant to go there.31
But that structure is unreliable and uncomfortable, for all the reasons that
deterrence doctrine suffers in more traditional contexts.32 Moreover, in
space, a profound asymmetry exacerbates the problems: the United States
30. See Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. Armed Services Comm., supra note 22, at 3, 5, 7–9; Assis- R
tant Sec’y of Def. for Homeland Def. & Glob. Sec., Space Domain Mission Assurance: A
Resilience Taxonomy (2015) (describing different approaches to reducing system vulnerability); U.S.
Dep’t of Def. & U.S. Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 28, at 10–11; Colby, supra note 1, at R
14 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of disaggregating satellite functions); Hitchens & John-
son-Freese, supra note 1, at 37–41; MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 65–79 (discussing methods to R
increase resilience of space assets); NRC Report, supra note 1, at 22–23; Space Security Index, supra R
note 1, at 26–27 (discussing the emergence of small satellites), 94–95 (dealing with reconstitution and R
resilience of space systems); Chow, supra note 9, at 88–93; Lynn, supra note 3, at 12 (asserting the need to R
make U.S. “space systems more resilient, and our combat power less reliant upon their full function-
ing.”); Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., Maps & Jammers: Army Intensifies Training vs. Russian-Style Jamming,
Breaking Def. (Mar. 18, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/fighting-blind-army-
intensifies-training-vs-russian-style-jamming/.
31. See Harrison et al., supra note 10, at 19–34; Lambakis, supra note 5, at 64–71 (stressing the R
importance of a U.S. capability to respond in kind to hostile use of ASATs); MacDonald et al., supra
note 1, at 43–46 (comparing the principles of deterrence in different military domains); Forrest E. R
Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space 26–30 (2010); Pollpeter et al., supra
note 3, at 112 (noting the danger that a U.S.-China space competition could create destabilizing incen- R
tives for each side to strike first, to seize the initiative during a crisis); Chow, supra note 9, at 92; Shea et R
al., supra note 10, at 63–65; Karl Mueller, The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear R
Deterrence and Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar—Yet Profoundly Different, in Anti-Satellite Weap-
ons, supra note 8, at 41, 41–48; Vedda & Hays, supra note 20, at 32–35; Stone, supra note 10. R
32. Laura Grego & David Wright, Securing the Skies, Union of Concerned Scientists
15–16 (2010); Krepon, supra note 26, at 31–32; Mueller, supra note 31, at 52; Karl P. Mueller, Six R
Propositions About Offense, Defense, and Crisis Stability in Space, in MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 52, R
52–64; Brian Chow, Avoiding a Space War Needs a New Approach, Def. News (Sept. 16, 2015), https://
www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2015/09/16/avoiding-space-war-needs-a-new-approach/;
Brian Chow, Fund Pre-Emptive Self-Defense in Space, Def. News (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.defensenews
.com/opinion/commentary/2015/10/20/fund-pre-emptive-self-defense-in-space/.
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extracts far more benefits from its satellites than do other countries, and the
U.S. satellite constellations are therefore more exposed and endangered than
others’. If a shooting war were to start in, or move to, space, the United
States would have far more to lose, and even if the U.S. ASAT capabilities
were greater than those of its rivals, the United States would run out of
targets to shoot at fairly quickly, long before its potential adversaries had
exhausted their ASAT magazines.33
In sum, the contemporary and emerging dangers are multifaceted. First,
and most obviously, any substantial use in combat of anti-satellite weapons
would be catastrophic: the damage to military capabilities and to the civil-
ian economy could be both vast and irreparable. Even the peacetime testing
or demonstration of an evolving ASAT musculature could generate an un-
tenable quantity of debris, ruining all states’ aspirations for effective, eco-
nomical use of space. Moreover, an international arms race in developing
competing mechanisms for asserting space control could deter optimal pat-
terns of peaceful exploitation of space, and even the current amplifying rhet-
oric about weaponization of space may make some wary potential space
actors hesitate about investing in new space capabilities.
The central premise of this Article—and a core postulate for much of the
standard U.S. national security policy—is that reliance upon measures of
deterrence and defense alone is insufficient and unsound. Arms-control mea-
sures—if well-crafted, with adequate assurances of verification of compliance
and robust enforcement—would provide a valuable complementary posture.
Instead of simply emulating and offsetting the undesired counter-space de-
ployments by our potential enemies, it would be more advantageous to pre-
vent those weapons from being developed and fielded in the first place.
Wise U.S. policy, therefore, should undertake to divert the leading spacefar-
ing states from ASAT competition, rather than lead (or even follow) an arms
race in that catastrophe-prone direction.34
33. See Dean Cheng, Heritage Found., Prospects for Extended Deterrence in Space and
Cyber: The Case of the PRC (2016) (contrasting U.S. and Chinese concepts of deterrence); Colby,
supra note 1, at 27 (concluding that, because the United States relies far more on space than its adversa- R
ries do, “[i]t therefore does not make sense for the United States to confine itself to responses solely in
the space domain since U.S. opponents are for the foreseeable future likely to be willing to forfeit their
own use of space in exchange for compromising the U.S. ability to exploit it.”); Harrison et al., supra
note 10, at 33; Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 42; Lewis, supra note 8, at 75; Bruce W. R
MacDonald, Deterrence and Crisis Stability in Space and Counterspace, in Anti-Satellite Weapons, supra
note 8, at 81; MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the perverse alignment of interests and R
threats in space that could generate an incentive to strike first during a time of crisis); Morgan, supra
note 31, at 26–30 (discussing the limits of punishment-based deterrence in space); see also Sergey R
Sukhankin, Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable, Real Clear Def. (May 26,
2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_warfare_in_ukraine_11
1460.html (describing Russia’s use of cyber and space weapons in Ukraine). But see Kulacki, supra note 8 R
(arguing that China may be more vulnerable than the United States in space).
34. See generally MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 33 (concluding that China does not seek a R
conflict with the United States in space, but wants to be prepared in case conflict someday appears
inevitable); Shimabukuro, supra note 7, at 21–22 (pondering why it has been so difficult to arrange arms R
control in space, when it appears to serve mutual interests); Maximillion Betmann, A Counterspace Awak-
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C. The Failure of Contemporary Law and Diplomacy
Unfortunately, despite the manifest need for an additional quantum of
arms control in outer space, the current international institutions and proce-
dures for articulating the necessary arrangements are dysfunctional. This
Section assesses the reasons for that enduring and lamentable diplomacy
deficit.
The story begins, however, with a much more optimistic observation. The
first decade or two of the Space Age were astonishingly successful in gener-
ating new law—indeed, that period provides a textbook illustration of how
effective and adroit the international prescriptive process can be, if the af-
fected states demand it.35
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (“OST”)36—concluded less than ten years
after Sputnik’s revolutionary first flight—established the central postulates
that still underpin human extraterrestrial activities: the exploration and use
of space “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries”;37 space “shall be free for exploration and use by all States”;38 space
“is not subject to national appropriation”;39 and parties shall carry out their
space activities “in accordance with international law, explicitly including
the Charter of the United Nations.”40 Regarding weapons specifically, arti-
cle IV of the OST prohibits parties from placing nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on the moon or other celestial bod-
ies, and it provides that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
“exclusively for peaceful purposes,” forbidding the establishment of military
bases, the testing of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers there.41
ening? (Part 2), Space Rev. (May 30, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3250/1 (“US offi-
cials also continue to stress that the US has no interest in taking a fight into space, as it would have the
most to lose in such an event.”).
35. See Francis Lyall & Paul B. Larsen, Space Law (2009); Handbook of Space Law, supra note
15; Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, in 10 Max Planck Y.B. R
United Nations L. 10, (2006); Soft Law in Outer Space (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012); Alexander
Soucek, 1 Space Law Essentials (2016); Space Law Treaties & Principles, U.N. Office for Outer
Space Affairs, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2017); What Is the MILAMOS Project?, McGill Univ., http://www.mcgill.ca/milamos/home (last visited
Nov. 17, 2017).
36. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter OST].
37. Id. art. I.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. II.
40. Id. art. III; see Ram S. Jakhu et al., Conflicts in Space and the Rule of Law, Space Pol’y (forthcoming
Spring 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722245 (identifying bodies of in-
ternational law relevant to space).
41. OST, supra note 36, art. IV; see also Lyall & Larsen, supra note 35, at 499–532; Raymond L. R
Garthoff, The Outer Space Treaty: 1967 to the Present, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 877; Stephen R
Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty, 3 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 114 (1973); Peter
Jankowitsch, The Background and History of Space Law, in Handbook of Space Law, supra note 15, at 1, R
14–20 (discussing space arms control); Schmitt, supra note 35, at 100–05; Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects R
of the Military Uses of Outer Space, in Handbook of Space Law, supra note 15, at 331, 335–41. R
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The OST quickly found widespread acceptance and has now been joined by
105 parties, including all the leading spacefaring states;42 much of its con-
tent has even passed into universally-applicable customary international
law.43
In short order, the OST was supplemented by three other critical treaties:
the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts;44 the 1972
Liability Convention;45 and the 1975 Registration Convention.46 Although
these instruments had little to say directly about military operations, collec-
tively they did rapidly flesh out the legal infrastructure supporting space
operations.47 They, too have enjoyed pervasive support, attracting, respec-
tively, 95, 94, and 63 parties.48
But the cavalcade of successful space-related agreements abruptly ended
in 1975. The Moon Treaty,49 concluded in 1979 largely to deal with ques-
tions regarding the potential future recovery of minerals and other assets
from the moon, has attracted only seventeen parties, conspicuously not in-
cluding the United States, Russia, China, and other leading interested
actors.50
Regarding space weapons in particular, the United States and the Soviet
Union trudged through three rounds of negotiations on a potential ASAT
treaty from 1978 to 1979, but found themselves stymied by discord over
42. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2017, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, at 12 (Mar. 23,
2017).
43. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 cmt n.2
(Am. Law Inst. 1987); Lyall & Larsen, supra note 35, at 53–80; Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions R
on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Customary Law?, 5 Indian J. Int’l Law 23, 36 (1965).
44. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 9574 U.N.T.S. 120. This treaty requires
parties to render necessary assistance to astronauts, and to return them and spacecraft to the launching
state.
45. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. Under this treaty, a launching state
has absolute liability for damage inflicted on Earth by its spacecraft, and liability for fault if its spacecraft
causes harm to another state’s satellites.
46. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 29 U.S.T.
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. This treaty requires each party to maintain a national registry of objects it
launches into space and to report basic information promptly to the United Nations.
47. Lyall & Larsen, supra note 35, at 81–127; Schmitt, supra note 35, at 108–11; Steer, supra note R
5, at 10. R
48. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 42, at 12. R
49. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UN Doc.
A/34/664, Nov. 12, 1979 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]; G.A. Res. 34/68, annex, Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Annex, UN Doc. A/RES/34/68, at 77
(1979).
50. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 42, at 12. The Moon Treaty also restates, and R
perhaps somewhat enlarges, the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition against nuclear weapons and selected
other military activities on the moon. Moon Treaty, supra note 49, art. 3; Lyall & Larsen, supra note R
35, at 181–83, 518. R
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fundamentals such as the definition of the to-be-prohibited activities and
objects. No agreed text was ever produced.51
The leading international forum that is supposed to serve as the midwife
for multilateral arms-control initiatives is the Conference on Disarmament, a
sixty-five-member body in Geneva, Switzerland, affiliated with the United
Nations.52 It has succeeded over the years in tackling some of the most chal-
lenging topics in arms control, including nuclear proliferation, biological
weapons, and chemical weapons.53 But an ASAT agreement has consistently
eluded its grasp—in fact, irreconcilable visions about a new order in space
and other disarmament controversies have proven so contentious that the
Conference on Disarmament has been unable even to agree on an active
agenda for its proceedings or to initiate any serious negotiations since
1995.54
Other space-related elements of the U.N. family have been more produc-
tive, but they have confined themselves to aspects dealing exclusively with
non-military functions. The eighty-four-member Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”),55 for example, has contributed impres-
sively to international collaboration regarding the safety and sustainability
of space operations, the coordination of various states’ activities, and the
51. See U.S. Dep’t of State, XXVI Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980:
Arms Control and Nonproliferation (Chris Tudda & Adam M. Howard eds. 2015), (documents
from the 1978–79 ASAT negotiations); James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Coop-
eration in Space 147–67 (2014) (surveying efforts at space diplomacy); Pike & Stambler, supra note
11, at 995; Stares, supra note 11, at 180–200; Weber & Drell, supra note 11, at 407–12; John Wert- R
heimer, The Antisatellite Negotiations, in Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight
139–63 (Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds., 1987); Eisenhower Ctr. for Space & Def. Studies,
Space Verification, 7 Space & Def. 55, 59–60 (2014). In addition, the START negotiations, beginning in
1982, focused on nuclear weapons, but also included a component that addressed space issues; however,
that sub-negotiation soon bogged down. See Thomas Graham, Jr. & Damien J. LaVera, Corner-
stones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era 885 (2003) (observing that the
space talks “never went anywhere.”); Dan Caldwell, from SALT to START: Limiting Strategic Nuclear
Weapons, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 895, 908–09. R
52. An Introduction to the Conference, U.N. Office at Geneva, https://www.unog.ch/80256EE6
00585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument (last visited Nov.
17, 2017); see Ben Baseley-Walker, Outer Space, Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament: Future Directions,
28 Space Pol’y 45 (2012).
53. U.N. Office at Geneva, supra note 52. R
54. U.N. Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of
the United Nations, 11–12, U.N. Doc. CD/2080 (Sept. 22, 2016). The Conference on Disarmament
(“CD”) ordinarily operates by a strict consensus rule, enabling even one determined resister to block
action by the group. See Moltz, supra note 51, at 157–58; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 115, R
117; Baseley-Walker, supra note 52; Mischa Hansel, The USA and Arms Control in Space, 26 Space Pol’y R
91, 92–93 (2010) (describing U.S. opposition to CD negotiation of an arms-control treaty for space
during the early 2000s, on the basis that there was then no arms race in space that needed resolution);
Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www
.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/ (last updated Sept.
29, 2017).
55. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www
.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also Christopher John-
son, Insight: The United Nations, COPUOS, and Space in 2017, Secure World Found. (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2017/08/insight-the-united-nations-copuos-and-space-in-2017.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 21 21-JUN-18 12:17
2018 / Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space 351
minimization of space debris, but it has not dared to venture into the turf of
arms control.56 The U.N. General Assembly has been somewhat more ame-
nable, adopting annual resolutions that exhort countries to pursue a broader
range of peaceful options for enhancing space cooperation, use, and law57 and
twice sponsoring a “Group of Governmental Experts” on space law and pol-
icy,58 but the General Assembly has only limited power to nudge the treaty-
making process forward.59
In this sorry stasis, two recent diplomatic initiatives stand out as repre-
senting at least bona fide efforts to articulate some of the needed security
measures for space—but the unambiguous failure of both now simply un-
derscores the global inability to come to grips with the emerging
problems.60
The first such enterprise is a joint Russian and Chinese venture to pro-
pound a Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space, and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects
56. See U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2016 Annual Report, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/70
(2017). COPUOS has also sponsored the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), which
has promulgated widely-recognized non-legally-binding guidelines on best practices to mitigate the cre-
ation of new space debris. See Secure World Found., The UN COPUOS Guidelines on the Long-
Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (2017); Space Security Index, supra note 1, at R
116 (reporting productive COPUOS work in elaborating a set of voluntary guidelines on Long-Term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities); Beard, supra note 1, at 382; Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordi- R
nation Comm., 20 Years of IADC http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2014/tech-32E.pdf (Feb. 2014);
Christopher D. Johnson & Victoria Samson, A Summer Update on the COPUOS Long-Term Sustainability
Guidelines, Space Rev. (July 24, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3291/1; History, U.N.
Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/history/index.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2017) (“Questions relating to the militarization of outer space are dealt with by the
Conference on Disarmament . . . .”); Our Work, U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www
.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (describing activities of COPUOS).
57. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 71/90, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (Dec. 6,
2016); G.A. Res. 71/31, Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (Dec. 5, 2016); G.A. Res. 71/32, No First
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (Dec. 5, 2016).
58. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28; Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 30; R
Paul Meyer, Dark Forces Awaken: The Prospects for Cooperative Space Security, 23 Nonproliferation Rev.
495, 6–7 (2016). The Group of Governmental Experts collected international expertise on space law and
policy but serves only to make limited findings and recommendations by consensus; it has no law-
making authority.
59. See U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, Space Security Conference 2017 (reporting
space activities of U.N. Institute of Disarmament Research); Lyall & Larsen, supra note 35, at 15–25, R
43–52; Massimo Pellegrino & Gerald Stang (Rapporteurs), Inst. for Sec. Studies, Issue Re-
port No. 29, Space Security for Europe, at 53–60 (2016) (discussing United Nations and other
international bodies for international space cooperation); Secure World Found., supra note 56; Space R
Security Index, supra note 1, at 111–18 (discussing the role of the United Nations and affiliated R
institutions in space governance); Space Law: Resolutions, U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, http:/
/www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/resolutions.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
60. See U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, supra note 59, at 25 (“In short, the future for R
space security diplomacy is fraught at the current stage. Differences among leading space powers are
being accentuated, while threat perceptions and military programmes based on them are increasing. All
of this can provide ready substantiation for a building up of national counterspace capabilities, which
would in turn fuel an incipient arms race that the international community has pledged to prevent.”);
Vedda & Hays, supra note 20, at 19–22. R
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(“PPWT”).61 Through a series of revised drafts, the PPWT would prohibit
the placement of weapons in space, but would not address weapons based on
Earth, sea, or air that could attack targets in space. It would ban “resort to
the threat or use of force against outer space objects of States Parties,”62 but
preserve the right of individual or collective self-defense, recognized by the
U.N. Charter.63 It contains no specifications regarding verification of com-
pliance, but it contemplates the future negotiation of an additional protocol
to deal with that crucial element; it does include some voluntary trans-
parency- and confidence-building measures.64 The United States has criti-
cized the shortcomings of the PPWT vigorously and in detail,65 and there is
little prospect that it can serve as the basis for productive negotiations.66
The second bid at new space law came from the European Union, which
has promulgated a series of drafts of an International Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities (“EU Code”).67 As envisaged, this instrument would
not be legally binding, but would attempt to establish workable “rules of
the road” to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of space opera-
tions.68 The document drew lukewarm support from the United States and
61. Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation and China to the Conference on Disarmament, Draft
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects, U.N. Doc. CD/1985 (June 12, 2014) [hereinafter PPWT]. See generally U.S.-China
Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, supra note 5; Su, supra note 15. Note that this Russian-Chinese proposal R
concerns “no first placement” of weapons in space, in contrast to the concept, discussed infra, of “no first
use” of such weapons. See Robinson, supra note 10. R
62. PPWT, supra note 61, art. II. R
63. Id. art. IV.
64. Id. art. V.
65. See Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament, Analysis of the
2014 Russian-Chinese draft “treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the
threat or use of force against outer space objects,” U.N. Doc. CD/1998 (Sept. 3, 2014); Permanent Rep.
of China to the Conference on Disarmament & Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Russian Federation, Follow-up
comments by the Russian Federation and China on the analysis submitted by the United States of
America of the updated Russian-Chinese draft PPWT, U.N. Doc. CD/2042 (Sept. 11, 2015); Frank A.
Rose, Assistant Sec’y of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Remarks to 3rd
ARF Workshop on Space Security: Challenges to Arms Control in Space and Pragmatic Way Ahead
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250231.htm. Note that the U.N. General
Assembly has endorsed at least the concept of banning the placement of weapons in space. See G.A. Res.
71/32, No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (Dec. 5, 2016).
66. See Moltz, supra note 51, at 158–59; Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the R
Weaponization of Outer Space, in Soft Law in Outer Space, supra note 35, at 361, 369–71; Space R
Security Index, supra note 1, at 117. R
67. European Union External Action Service, Draft International Code of Conduct
for Outer Space Activities (2014) [hereinafter EU Code] (also known as the International Code); see
also Observer Research Found., Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft ICOC for
Outer Space Activities (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014); Beard, supra
note 1, passim; Jinyuan Su & Zhu Lixin, The European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, R
30 Space Pol’y 34 (2014).
68. EU Code, supra note 67, art. I.1.1. Under the EU Code, participating states would agree to R
implement specified transparency and confidence-building measures (art. I.1.3), to refrain from the threat
or use of force against others (art. I.2, para. 2), to establish national procedures to minimize the risks of
accidents, collisions, and interference (art. II.4.1), to refrain from actions that would damage or destroy
space objects unless justified by specified exceptions (art. II.4.2), and to notify others before undertaking
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 23 21-JUN-18 12:17
2018 / Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space 353
others,69 but many criticized both the substance of the draft (including both
the confined scope of its ambitions and the extent to which it might seem to
authorize, rather than to restrict, uses of force in space)70 and the process
through which it was developed (including its presentation as a “take it or
leave it” draft, with little scope for international negotiation).71 Like the
PPWT, the EU Code may not quite be “dead” as a diplomatic undertaking,
but it now seems implausible that it will ever attract a substantial consensus
among the most important potential participants.72
Conspicuously absent from the roster of recent undertakings for arms con-
trol in outer space have been any comprehensive initiatives from the United
States. Indeed, even the Obama administration adopted an official policy
under which it would listen to proposals and concepts for new measures of
space arms control—provided they were equitable, effectively verifiable, and
enhanced U.S. and allied national security interests—but U.S. officials
would not exercise any forward-leaning leadership on point or sponsor any
overtures of their own.73 Reinforcing that self-restraint, congressional skep-
specified space activities (art. III.5); see also Beard, supra note 1, at 357; Su & Lixin, supra note 67, at R
35–36.
69. See Beard, supra note 1, at 392–93; Conrad et al., supra note 25, at 12–19; Michael Listner, U.S. R
Rebuffs Current Draft of EU Code of Conduct, Space Rev. (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/2006/1 (discussing U.S. reversal of position on the acceptability of the EU Code); Meyer, supra
note 58, at 499 (characterizing the United States as “a persistent if tepid backer” of the EU Code); R
Michael Krepon, Space Code of Conduct Mugged in New York, Arms Control Wonk (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404712/space-code-of-conduct-mugged-in-new-york/.
70. Conrad et al., supra note 25, at 15–19; Michael Krepon, Will Gravity Lift the Space Code of Con- R
duct?, Arms Control Wonk (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/403944/
will-gravity-lift-the-space-code-of-conduct/ (comments by Mark Gubrud); Listner, supra note 69 (citing R
substantive concerns raised by several countries); see also Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, ICoC: Recommendations
for Further Elaboration, in Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft ICOC for Outer Space
Activities 45, 49–50 (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014); Kazuto Suzuki,
ICoC and the Right of Self Defence, in Awaiting Launch, supra, at 87, 89–92.
71. See Gerard Brachet, E.U. Nonproliferation Consortium, The Security of Space Activ-
ities, 1, 6–7 (2016); U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, supra note 5; Space Security Index, R
supra note 1, at 117–18; Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 12–13; Beard, supra note 1, at 390–91; Su & R
Lixin, supra note 67, at 35; Krepon, supra note 69. R
72. Brachet, supra note 71, at 6 (assessing that the EU project “seems to be in the doldrums”); R
Beard, supra note 1, at 390; Timothy Farnsworth, Space Code Process Called “Unsuccessful,” Arms Control R
Today, Mar. 2016, at 5 (quoting State Department official as saying that the effort to negotiate the EU
Code was unsuccessful); Meyer, supra note 58, at 499–500. But see Moltz, supra note 51, at 160–62 R
(expressing somewhat greater optimism that the EU Code might represent a path forward for space
diplomacy).
73. See The White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America 7 (2010)
(“The United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building mea-
sures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. The United States will consider
proposals and concepts for arms-control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance
the national security of the United States and its allies.”); U.S. Dep’t of Def. & U.S. Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence, supra note 28, at 10; Beard, supra note 1, at 424; Michael Krepon, Is Space the Final War- R
Fighting Frontier?, Arms Control Wonk (July 26, 2017), http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/
1203399/is-space-the-final-war-fighting-frontier/ (judging that the Obama administration had other
arms-control priorities besides outer space, and did not want to stir up additional political opposition);
Frank A. Rose, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Remarks at the
International Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space: Using Diplomacy to Advance the
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ticism over any arms control in space remains intense—even including ex-
pressing outrage at the relatively unassuming provisions of the EU Code.74
It is still too early to know whether the Trump administration will prove to
be more forthcoming regarding legal restraints to preserve the safety and
security of outer space, but at this writing, there is little reason to be opti-
mistic that the world’s collective passivity regarding the emerging dangers
will be addressed in any meaningful diplomatic fashion in the foreseeable
future.75
• • •
Faced with this unpleasant contradiction—an insistent need to do some-
thing effective to mitigate an emerging arms race in space, coupled with a
failure of traditional arms-control mechanisms to rise to the occasion—the
Article now proposes a series of suggestions. It is important not to over-
promise here: Parts II (no first use), III (limited test ban), and IV (shared
space situational awareness) each proffers only ideas of tightly circumscribed
scope and is wholly insufficient to ward off all the incipient dangers. But
perhaps their modesty is a virtue; they should be promptly doable, enabling
participants to register some near-term accomplishments, even while they
Long-Term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment, (Mar. 3, 2016), https://ge-
neva.usmission.gov/2016/03/07/using-diplomacy-to-advance-the-long-term-sustainability-and-security-
of-the-outer-space-environment/ (affirming that “the United States is not opposed to space arms control
in principle,” and supporting the development of confidence-building measures).
74. See Beard, supra note 1, at 400–04; Shimabukuro, supra note 7, at 19; Listner, supra note 69; R
Michael Listner, Separation of Powers Battle Continues over the Code of Conduct, Space Rev. (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2215/1. See Jeff Kueter & John B. Sheldon, Heritage
Found., An Investment Strategy for National Security Space, Special Report No. 129, at 10
(2013) http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/an-investment-strategy-for-national-security-
space (arguing that the EU Code of Conduct “is not in the interests of the United States and can leave
U.S. national security space capabilities needlessly vulnerable”); John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Opinion,
Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-
off-the-heavens.html; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239,
§ 913, 126 Stat. 1632, 1874–76 (Congressional restrictions on international agreements concerning
outer space activities, including the EU Code).
75. See Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,501 (Dec. 11,
2017); Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 7–8 (“While there is widespread international recogni- R
tion that the existing regulatory framework is insufficient to meet the current challenges facing the outer
space domain, the development of an overarching normative regime has been slow. Space actors have
been unable to reach consensus on the exact nature of a space security regime.”); Jakhu et al., supra note
40, at 22 (concluding that it is “undoubtedly clear” that the adoption of a new space treaty in the near- R
or medium-term “does not seem possible.”); Jankowitsch, supra note 41, at 26–28; Dr. Scott Pace, Exec. R
Sec’y, Nat’l Space Council, Space Development, Law, and Values, Address at the International Institute
of Space Law Galloway Space Law Symposium (Dec. 13, 2017), https://spacepolicyonline.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/12/Scott-Pace-to-Galloway-Symp-Dec-13-2017.pdf; Bill Gertz, Pentagon Gearing Up
for Space Warfare, Free Beacon (Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/penta-
gon-gearing-space-warfare/; President Donald J. Trump Is Unveiling an America First National Space Strategy,
White House (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-unveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/; see also The White House, National Secur-
ity Strategy of the United States of America 31 (2017) (“The United States must maintain our
leadership and freedom of action in space.”).
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seek to reinvigorate progress toward larger, more controversial subsequent
steps.
II. No First Use
This Part deals with the notion of an international agreement to avoid a
first use of space weapons. It first defines the proposition in more detail and
discusses a number of variations and options to consider; then it identifies
what the proposal can, and cannot, essay to accomplish; and finally it de-
scribes precedents from elsewhere in the history of arms control that may
provide some support for the viability and utility of the concept.
A. The NFU Proposal and Its Variations
The core conceit of a “no first use” (“NFU”) scheme is simple: participat-
ing states would each undertake not to be first to violate the taboo against
employing a specified weapon, here an ASAT device, in combat. Behind that
nostrum, however, lies a host of sub-options.
For example, the NFU commitment could be entrenched in legally-bind-
ing form, through a treaty or similar undertaking;76 in a non-legally-bind-
ing (or politically-binding) document; or in a series of orchestrated, parallel,
revocable, self-declared unilateral statements of intention. In general, the
accoutrements of black letter international law should provide a greater de-
gree of formality and seriousness of purpose, but it is hard to demonstrate
that legally-binding instruments are categorically more important, more en-
during, or more fully complied with than mere political “soft law”
documents.77
In either case, the defined scope of an NFU undertaking would be subject
to negotiation, in multiple dimensions. It could deal exclusively with ki-
netic-energy devices or embrace directed-energy and cyber weapons, too.78
Likewise, it could bar only “destruction” of a target, or also extend to mech-
anisms that would inflict only partial, or only temporary, suspensions of
normal satellite operations. The coverage could be further modulated to pro-
76. In principle, a legally-binding NFU commitment could be established through other routes, such
as a resolution of the U.N. Security Council, customary international law, or unilateral undertakings. For
present purposes, the focus will be on treaty possibilities.
77. For example, recent U.S. international practice has seen important, high-visibility international
arrangements established via multiple routes, including by treaty, see, e.g., 2017 Treaties and Agreements,
U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/2017/index.htm, by executive agreement, see,
e.g., 2015 Paris Agreement, Apr. 22, 2016, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://
unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf, and by
non-legally-binding agreement, see, e.g., Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, U.S. Dep’t.
of State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (regarding Iran’s nuclear program). See MacDon-
ald, supra note 9, at 81, 82–83; Soft Law in Outer Space, supra note 35; Beard, supra note 1, at R
346–53, 411–13; Hansel, supra note 54, at 93–95; Jankowitsch, supra note 41, 20–26. R
78. See supra text accompanying note 10 (describing different physical principles for ASAT
mechanisms).
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tect only the satellite or extend to its associated ground stations and the
links between them. The self-restraint could apply categorically to all satel-
lites, or it could preferentially protect only specified types, such as those that
were central to states’ strategic nuclear operations, while leaving unpro-
tected the satellites that support tactical or conventional warfare.
In addition, the participants would have to decide whether to protect only
satellites of those states that had joined the agreement, or to express a prom-
ise not to employ weapons first against anyone, even those who did not com-
mit themselves to reciprocal undertakings. If the more restricted version of
an ASAT ban were adopted, negotiators would then have to decide how best
to attribute a particular satellite to a particular state (or states), a problem
growing in complexity during an era in which space objects are increasingly
owned and operated by private actors or by public/private consortia with ties
to multiple countries.79
Obviously, the most comprehensive version of an NFU pledge—legally
binding, applying to all forms of systems and extending to all states—
would be the strongest, and provide the most arms control value. But it is
quite possible that the political dynamics of the day would compel the nego-
tiators to begin with a relatively temperate version of the undertaking, hop-
ing it would grow over time.80
B. What an NFU Agreement Could, and Could Not, Accomplish
The primary direct contribution of an ASAT NFU agreement would be to
attempt to delegitimize counter-space operations, to reinforce the interna-
tional taboo against employing military force in that way. It could help
define use of these weapons as unacceptable, something that civilized coun-
tries simply do not do (or, at least, do not do unless their enemies have
already done it first).81
In a more pragmatic vein, this type of commitment would rein in some of
the provocative rhetoric that countries occasionally employ in their public
statements about their military operations and in their defense doctrine and
manuals. For example, it would inhibit truculent comments that “all op-
79. See IDA, supra note 1, at 4.20; Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 22–40 (describing China’s R
various cooperative arrangements in space with many countries); Space Security Index, supra note 1, at R
76–80 (discussing the growth in public-private collaboration in space); Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop,
Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. Rev.
157, 157 (2004) (noting the increased U.S. military reliance upon commercial satellites owned by foreign
and domestic entities).
80. See MacDonald, supra note 9, at 7 (reporting that some Chinese writings suggest that China is R
considering adopting a space NFU policy).
81. See Colby, supra note 1, at 21 (endorsing the concept that the United States should promote the R
principle that “being the first to carry war into space is escalatory and irresponsible”); William Burr &
Jeffrey Kimball, Seven Decades after Hiroshima, Is There Still a Nuclear Taboo?, Bull. Atomic Scientists
(Aug. 4, 2015), https://thebulletin.org/seven-decades-after-hiroshima-there-still-nuclear-taboo8591 (dis-
cussing the power of a taboo in international affairs). But see MacDonald, supra note 9, at 41 (“There is R
no taboo against the use of many counter-space systems.”).
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tions are on the table” in dealing with a particular crisis or problem.82 It
would likewise affect the justifications for funding space weapons and the
training routines and war games that military space forces conduct.83
In this vein, a useful adjunct to an NFU agreement could be a joint state-
ment—parallel to President Reagan’s famous assertion regarding nuclear
weapons—to the effect that a war in space “cannot be won and must never
be fought.”84 Acknowledging the potentially catastrophic effects of multi-
plying space debris, national leaders could commit themselves to avoiding
such pyrrhic encounters.
Admittedly, the practical effect of an NFU undertaking is confined. In
particular, this sort of verbal declaration or agreement does not categorically
prohibit or restrict the development, testing, production, or deployment of
space weapons, because virtually all of the same hardware and many of the
other preparations for a (legal) second use of a weapon would be indistin-
guishable from those associated with an (illegal) first use. The NFU treaty or
commitment would therefore exert only a modest suppression upon the re-
tention or development of states’ capabilities for engaging in space warfare.85
Furthermore, a state participating in an NFU accord, even a legally-bind-
ing document that was widely adopted by its potential opponents, would
probably not feel sufficiently secure to let down its guard very much. That
is, declaratory policies, even if codified in a treaty of this sort, could not
provide much guarantee that some rogue state will not, in fact, use its sys-
tem first. There is no assurance against a sudden “breakout” from the
treaty—the ban could be fully complied with until the sudden moment
when it was completely violated, and the cheater might be able to seize a
substantial military advantage via its instantaneous breach. Verification of
compliance with an NFU treaty could be another issue; perhaps it would
ordinarily be possible to identify a first ASAT strike and to attribute it to a
particular state, but it is certainly conceivable that in other circumstances it
might be difficult to establish responsibility for the attack.86
82. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the effect of “muscular rhetoric” R
on U.S. space security); Burr & Kimball, supra note 81 (noting instances of President Bush asserting that R
“all options are on the table” in hinting at possible use of nuclear weapons); Justin McCurry, Trump Tells
Japan “All Options on the Table” in Face of North Korea Provocation, Guardian (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www
.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/trump-japan-all-options-north-korea-provocation.
83. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 30–32 (discussing contrasting views about the wisdom of R
employing more frank and direct language in discussing threats to space security and possible military
responses).
84. Ronald Reagan, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1984), https://www.reagan-
library.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1984/12584e.htm.
85. Cf. Paul Ingram, BASIC Briefing Paper: Renewing Interest in Negative Security As-
surances (2017) (underscoring the importance of declaratory policies in nuclear nonproliferation); Al-
berto Perez Vadillo, BASIC, Beyond the Ban: The Humanitarian Initiative of Nuclear
Disarmament and Advocacy of No-First-Use Nuclear Doctrines 10–11 (2016) (stressing the
practical consequences of adopting an NFU policy regarding nuclear weapons).
86. See Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 182–84; Nayak, supra note 4, at 2, 7 (discussing the prob- R
lem of attributing an ASAT attack to a particular country, and whether an attacker could preserve
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Moreover, the retained permission to use a weapon second, after the pro-
scription has been shattered by some other actor, could raise complicated
questions of interpretation. If country A uses a device against country B,
then surely it would be legitimate for B to respond in kind against A.87 But
could state C also take the opportunity to shoot at A’s satellites (assuming
either that there is some sort of alliance relationship between B and C, or
not)? For that matter, once A has shattered the NFU prohibition, are all
limitations removed, so it would be permissible for C to fire a weapon
against state D’s satellites (again, alternatively assuming there is, or is not,
any special connection between A and D)?88
C. Precedents for NFU in Arms Control
Demonstrating a clear provenance for a controversial idea does not, of
course, establish its wisdom or prove its adaptability to different circum-
stances, but the history can be illuminating nonetheless. In the case of an
NFU pledge, there are ample precedents available, and they have achieved
considerable success in other zones of arms control.
The most direct prior expression of NFU comes from the realm of chemi-
cal and biological weapons. Under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, participants
eschew the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacterio-
logical methods of warfare.”89 Through a network of reservations, this cate-
gorical prohibition was converted essentially into a commitment not to use
such weapons first, and only with respect to other states assuming reciprocal
plausible deniability); Ahsan Ali Zahid & Hasan Ehtisham, The Enduring Hypocrisy of Nuclear No First Use,
Mod. Dipl. (Aug. 22, 2017), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2017/08/22/the-enduring-hypocrisy-of-nu-
clear-no-first-use/ (arguing that other countries cannot trust an NFU pledge and that despite Russia
making an NFU declaration in 1982, it was secretly prepared to use nuclear weapons first if necessary);
infra text accompanying notes 158–81 (regarding proposals to enhance space situational awareness, to R
provide greater certainty in identifying and attributing an ASAT attack).
87. Note that any legal use of force in space would be bound by the corpus of jus in bello. See Peter
Hulsroj & Anja Nakarada Pecujlic, Space Through the Lens of Neutrality, in Monograph Series V: Con-
flicts in Space and the Rule of Law, 437 (Maria Manoli & Sandy Belle Habchi eds., 2018);
Tronchetti, supra note 66, at 350–59; Dale Stephens & Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International R
Humanitarian Law and Its Application to Space Warfare (Univ. of Adelaide Law Sch., RUMLAE Research
Paper No. 16-18, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767980.
88. See Steven Starr et al., New Terminology to Help Prevent Accidental Nuclear War, Bull. Atomic
Scientists (Sept. 29, 2015), https://thebulletin.org/new-terminology-help-prevent-accidental-nuclear-
war8773 (discussing ambiguity about what counts as a “first” use of a weapon in near-combat
situations).
89. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol].
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obligations.90 The treaty was very widely accepted and remains in force to-
day (although largely superseded, as elaborated, infra).91
Unsurprisingly, despite the global support for the Geneva Protocol (and
despite the universal revulsion at the shocking humanitarian consequences
that chemical weapons had inflicted during World War I), many countries
continued to build up their chemical and biological weapons inventories. In
fact, new generations of even more deadly nerve agents were crafted to sup-
plement or replace the mustard gas, phosgene, and other horrors of the ear-
lier conflict. As World War II raged, combatants armed themselves with
massive chemical ordnance, and most grimly anticipated that these arsenals
would again be used on a grand scale.92
Still, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to avoid that cataclysm, by
employing the device of an NFU undertaking. Although the United States
had not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol, he publicly asserted that the
United States would refrain from employing its chemical weapons if the
Axis powers would do likewise.93 Remarkably, even without any additional
formal legal commitment—and in the midst of a global conflagration that
knew few other humanitarian restraints—these special arms were not em-
ployed by the opposing forces in the central battlefields of the European
Theater.94 It is, of course, impossible to prove how much the Geneva Proto-
col and the Roosevelt reciprocity statement, in concert with the deterrent
threat of retaliation in kind, were responsible for that unanticipated non-use,
but it does appear that the NFU commitments made important
contributions.
In fact, the pattern regarding chemical and biological weapons over the
following decades revealed only rare international usage, accompanied by a
profound sense that any country that resorted to these reviled weapons was
90. W. Seth Carus, Ctr. for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, A Short His-
tory of Biological Warfare 14 (2017); Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 8; John Ellis van R
Courtland Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World War II, in Encyclopedia,
supra note 11, at 657, 664–66. R
91. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacterio-
logical Methods of Warfare, U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/
t/1925 (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (listing 140 current parties to the Geneva Protocol). See infra text
accompanying notes 96–99 for a discussion of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which largely
displaced the Geneva Protocol.
92. Moon, supra note 90, at 666–73. R
93. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, The Axis Is Warned Against the Use of Poison Gas (June 8,
1943), in 1943 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 242, 243 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950); Barton J. Bernstein, America’s Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War,
11 J. Strategic Stud. 3, 292 (1988) (noting that Roosevelt’s NFU undertaking applied to chemical
weapons but not to biological weapons); Moon, supra note 90, at 669. R
94. Chemical weapons were used by Italy against Ethiopia, by Japan against China, and by Germany
against Jews in concentration camps. Moon, supra note 90, at 666, 669; Glenn Cross, Long Ignored: The R
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons Against Insurgents, War on Rocks (Aug. 14, 2017), https://
warontherocks.com/2017/08/long-ignored-the-use-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-against-insur-
gents/ (analyzing the use of chemical and biological weapons against targets that were poorly equipped or
trained to resist, especially non-state insurgent groups).
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behaving as a pariah. States mostly did not disarm their chemical and bio-
logical weapons, but they did not often engage those capacities in conflict.95
Formal elaboration of the NFU commitments, and advancement beyond
them, required additional decades. The 1972 Biological Weapons Conven-
tion96 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention97 established broad,
widely-accepted prohibitions—parties undertook not to develop, produce,
stockpile, or otherwise acquire the stigmatized weapons; not to use them
(first or second); and, in the case of chemical weapons, to destroy not only
the arms but also the facilities that had been used to create them.98 Both the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention ex-
pressly acknowledge the Geneva Protocol as the legal genesis for their much
more ambitious undertakings.99
Another important precedent for NFU commitments comes from the
world of nuclear weapons, where the history is more checkered. During the
Cold War, for example, when massive NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were
entrenched across Central Europe, the Soviet Union advocated that the
countries possessing nuclear weapons should agree never to use them first, so
any conflict on the continent would be at least somewhat confined. At that
time, however, the United States and its allies feared they might not be able
to contain a massive westward aggression by conventional forces. They con-
cluded that it was valuable for deterrence to retain a measure of strategic
ambiguity, including the possibility that the West might breach the nuclear
barrier to repel an attack. No NFU agreement was reached.100
Years later, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and the precipitous cratering of the Russian economy, the
military calculations were reversed. The United States and its newly-ex-
panded collection of allies grew more confident about their ability to resist
95. Charles C. Flowerree, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control, in Encyclopedia, supra
note 11, at 999, 1002–04; Moon, supra note 90, at 668–73; Milton Leitenberg, China’s False Allegations of R
the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States During the Korean War 7 (Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for
Scholars, Working Paper No. 78, 2016) (quoting secret U.S. policy documents in force from 1950 to
1956 stating that “chemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be used by the United States
except in retaliation”). But see Cross, supra note 94 (discussing instances of the use of chemical and R
biological weapons against non-state actors).
96. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention or BWC].
97. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction art. XXI, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter CWC]. The CWC largely supersedes, but
explicitly does not derogate from, the Geneva Protocol. Id. art. XVI.
98. Id. art. I; BWC, supra note 96, art. I; see Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 292–95, 1168–70; R
Flowerree, supra note 95, at 1004–14. R
99. CWC, supra note 97, pmbl. para. 3, art. XIII; BWC, supra note 96, pmbl. para. 2, art. VIII. R
100. Fen Osler Hampson, “No-First-Use” Nuclear Policy, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 1069; R
Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurances, Arms Control Ass’n (June 30, 2016), https://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/declaratorypolicies [hereinafter NSA Fact Sheet] (citing U.S.S.R.’s 1982
nuclear NFU pledge).
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aggression, and they were more favorably disposed toward a nuclear NFU
agreement for the continent. This time, however, the newly disempowered
Russia declined.101
More generally, a nuclear NFU commitment—in the form of a “negative
security assurance”—has become an important tool in the global campaign
for nuclear non-proliferation.102 Under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (“NPT”),103 most countries agreed to give up any right to possess
nuclear weapons of their own, but they have sought guarantees from the
countries that continue to possess those arms that they will not use them
against the non-nuclear states. In response, each of the five nuclear weapons
possessors who are parties to the NPT have extended some form of negative
security assurance in various vocabulary over the years.104 These statements
run beyond the concept of NFU in constituting commitments not to use
nuclear weapons at all against the countries that have foresworn them, but
the assurances are typically laden with exceptions or limitations that make a
negative security assurance functionally quite similar to an NFU state-
ment.105 Notably, pressures continue to emerge from the “recipients,” who
press for the assurances to be expanded into a more comprehensive, unquali-
fied, and clearly legally-binding form, seeking to diminish the value of nu-
clear weapons as “the coin of the realm” in national security debates and as
the badge of “first-class citizenship.” Conversely, the nuclear weapons
states’ failure to satisfy those demands, and their insistence that nuclear
weapons remain “usable,” have emerged as significant dangers to the con-
tinued integrity and viability of the NPT regime.106
101. Hampson, supra note 100, at 1073–75; NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 100 (describing Russia’s R
various partial NFU policy statements in 1993 and 1995).
102. NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 100; see also Ingram, supra note 85 (discussing negative security R
assurances); Ray Acheson & Beatrice Fihn, Reaching Critical Will, Negative Security Assur-
ances, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/nsa.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2018); Beatrice Fihn, U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, The Conference on
Disarmament and Negative Security Assurances (2011); Marc Finaud, Why New Thinking Is
Needed on Negative Security Assurances, 47 Arms Control Today, Oct. 2017, at 12; Ali Zahid & Eh-
tisham, supra note 86 (discussing Indian and Pakistani approaches to nuclear assurances). R
103. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter NPT].
104. Acheson & Fihn, supra note 102. R
105. See NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 100; Proposed Internationally Legally-Binding Negative Security Assur- R
ances (NSAs), Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-in-
ternationally-legally-binding-negative-security-assurances/ (last updated May 1, 2017) (also noting
“positive security assurances,” that is, commitments to come to the assistance of a country victimized by
a nuclear weapons attack; this concept, too, could be adapted for the space context).
106. See Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 102–03; Ingram, supra note 85 (analyzing the impor- R
tance of negative security assurances in the NPT); Finaud, supra note 102; James E. Cartwright & Bruce R
G. Blair, Opinion, End the First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2016), https://
nyti.ms/2ktoSyD (asserting that a nuclear NFU policy would “further delegitimize nuclear weapons”);
Alyn Ware & Jean-Marie Collin, European Parliaments Demand “No-First-Use”—Obama’s Nuclear Agenda
Analysed, InDepthNews (July 12, 2016), https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/nuclear-abolition/
527-european-parliaments-demand-no-first-use-obama-s-nuclear-agenda-analysed. But see Michaela
Dodge, Some Bad Ideas, Like Zombies, Never Die. A “No First Use” Nuclear Policy Is One of Them, Daily
Signal (Aug. 16, 2017), http://dailysignal.com/2017/08/16/bad-ideas-like-zombies-never-die-no-first-
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Finally in this area, it is worth highlighting the controversy over the
latest evolutions in the U.S. unilateral, non-legally-binding nuclear NFU
statement. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report—a broad, funda-
mental reassessment of the foundations of nuclear weapons policy—the
Obama Administration undertook to assess the prior U.S. public assurances,
and to make a more definitive commitment, as part of its contribution to
the global non-proliferation effort.107 Intense internal debate emerged
within the government, resulting in an uneasy compromise. The Pentagon
report declared: “[T]he United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.”108
In 2018, the Trump Administration released its own Nuclear Posture
Review Report,109 which revised the NFU statement to expand the range of
circumstances in which the United States would consider the employment of
nuclear weapons. Now included in the roster of “extreme circumstances”
justifying a first use are “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks . . . on the
U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on
the U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and
attack assessment capabilities.”110 Under this standard, a cyber attack, for
example, could now trigger a nuclear response.111
In sum, there is to date no comprehensive NFU policy regarding nuclear
weapons by the United States or others. But if the controversy and the back-
and-forth gyrations of public policy over the years prove anything, it is to
establish the proposition that an NFU statement is not dismissed as “mere
use-nuclear-policy-one/ (contending that a U.S. nuclear NFU policy would spur nuclear proliferation). See
generally Stephan Haggard, The Fourth Nuclear Test, North Korea: Witness to Transformation
Blog (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:45 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/fourth-nu-
clear-test (describing North Korea’s official nuclear NFU posture and dismissing it as “almost entirely
disingenuous”).
107. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010); Amy F. Woolf, Cong.
Research Serv., U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering “No First Use,” (2016), https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10553.pdf; Bruce Blair, How Obama Could Revolutionize Nuclear Weapons Strategy
Before He Goes, Politico (June 22, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-
obama-nuclear-weapons-213981; NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 100; Keith B. Payne, Once Again: Why a “No- R
First-Use” Policy Is a Bad, Very Bad Idea, Nat’l Rev. (July 6, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/437510/it-would-reduce-potential-cost-using-conventional-chemical-and-biological-attacks.
108. U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 107, at 15. In the Report, the United States also reserved the R
right to adjust the assurance, if required by developments in and proliferation of biological weapons. The
Report also emphasized that although the United States was not then prepared to adopt a comprehensive
NFU statement, it “will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely
adopted.” Id. at 16; see also Finaud, supra note 102, at 13–14; NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 100 (identifying R
key elements in U.S. NFU posture).
109. Office of the Sec’y of Def., Nuclear Posture Review (2018).
110. Id. at 21.
111. David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks with
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. Times (Jan. 16, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FLHxl0.
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words.” People, government departments, and leading nations care a great
deal about even the nuances of NFU policy.112
A proposed NFU statement about anti-satellite weapons, in a similar
fashion, would not magically re-order the field, but it would be consequent-
ial nevertheless; it would make a difference in global security calculations
that would be worth struggling to get right.
III. Limited Test Ban
The second proposal runs an important step beyond the NFU sphere of
public posture statements and undertakes to constrain (again, in a humble,
beginning way) the physical behavior of counter-space operations. Specifi-
cally, this Article advocates restrictions upon the testing in space of specified
types of ASAT systems. Again, the discussion is divided into consideration
of the idea and its variations; the advantages and disadvantages it might
carry; and the precedents from elsewhere in arms control.
A. The Test Ban Proposal and Its Variations
The core concept here is for the relevant states to agree to restrict their
developmental testing of certain types of ASAT systems; the key operational
question is how “limited” vs. “comprehensive” that test-ban structure
should become.
Prominent among the variants to consider is the question (as noted in
Part II, dealing with NFU declarations113) whether the test-ban undertaking
should be cast in legally-binding or politically-binding form. Also up for
grabs is the matter of duration: whether the commitment would be for a
fixed (long or short) period of time, of indefinite length, or permanent.114
112. See Dominic Tierney, Refusing to Nuke First, Atlantic (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic
.com/international/archive/2016/09/nuclear-obama-north-korea-pakistan/499676/ (reviewing the contro-
versy over possible adoption of a U.S. nuclear NFU posture, and concluding that such a doctrine is not
merely idealistic, but is a strategy available to the strongest states, who try to shift the focus of a possible
future conflict onto the terms most advantageous to themselves); Cartwright & Blair, supra note 106 R
(stressing the operational consequences of an NFU declaration; it is not just words); Josh Rogin, Opin-
ion, U.S. Allies Unite to Block Obama’s Nuclear “Legacy,” Wash. Post (Aug. 14, 2016), http://wapo.st/
2DHwiYh (describing opposition from close U.S. allies to possible adoption of a nuclear NFU policy);
Franklin C. Miller, The Dangers of No-First-Use, Bull. Atomic Scientists (Aug. 22, 2016), https://
thebulletin.org/dangers-no-first-use9790 (describing dangers of a nuclear NFU declaration).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. R
114. As noted in infra note 144, the first voluntary moratorium on explosive testing of nuclear weap- R
ons lasted for three years. The treaties limiting nuclear weapons testing have been of permanent duration,
although for much of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the most compre-
hensive treaty, the United States favored a treaty that would be operational for only ten years. See, e.g.,
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty art. IX, ¶ 1, Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28
(1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439 (not yet in force) [hereinafter CTBT]; 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water art. IV, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480
U.N.T.S. 6964 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBT]; John M. Shalikashvili, Report on
the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty 13–14 (2001), https://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/shalictbt.htm (noting that the most contro-
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Another crucial issue would be which states would participate in the test
ban regime. Obviously, the affiliation by the three leading space actors
would be of utmost importance, but universal adherence would also be
highly desirable. It is possible, perhaps, for the agreement to initially in-
clude only a relatively small roster of states and then to grow over time, as
many arms control instruments have done.115
The definition of a prohibited “test” could be quite complicated here, as
it sometimes has been in prior applications.116 Because, as noted above,
many military operations in outer space are dual-capable, contributing to
both the ASAT mission and to the development of missile defense capabili-
ties (as well as to peaceful exploration and exploitation of space), the line-
drawing could be particularly contentious.117 Likewise, negotiators for a
space test-ban agreement would have to address provisions for verification of
compliance, a task that might be relatively straightforward, but not auto-
matic, in this context.118
The proposal here is unpretentious—simply to bar tests in space of any
ASAT system in a mode that generates significant amounts of long-lasting
space debris. Admittedly, there is considerable ambiguity in the words “sig-
nificant” and “long-lasting.” Virtually all space activities result in some
debris, and accidents or plain bad luck can greatly magnify the pollution.119
But the intention is at least to preclude a rerun of the disastrous Chinese
2007 event, which spawned an unprecedented cluster of enduring hazardous
versial aspect of the initial U.S. negotiating position regarding the CTBT was the proposal that the
initial duration of the treaty should be only ten years, after which a country could easily exit; the treaty
was ultimately concluded as a permanent agreement).
115. The NPT, supra note 102, for example, was opened for signature in 1968, and thirty-eight states R
had ratified it by 1970. Many more parties drifted in later, and the treaty currently boasts 191 parties. See
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://disarma-
ment.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (complete list of current parties to the NPT).
Entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 114, required ratification only by the Soviet R
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who were designated as the “Original Parties.” In
practice, the LTBT drew many adherents promptly after its 1963 opening for signature, but there were
many latecomers among its 125 current parties. See LTBT, supra note 114, art. III, ¶ 3; Treaty Banning R
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, U.N. Office for Disarmament
Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban (listing all current parties to the LTBT).
116. See, e.g., John Burroughs, Key Issues in Negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, 47
Arms Control Today, June 2017, at 6, 8 (discussing the difficulty of defining terms such as “test,”
“research,” and “design” in the negotiation of a treaty banning nuclear weapons).
117. See supra text accompanying note 20 for a discussion of the overlap between ASAT and missile R
defense technology and testing.
118. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 20, at 153. R
119. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 9 (conceding that all space missions generate some R
quantity of debris).
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material.120 Other space activities, even those resulting in a “normal” dis-
persal of debris, would be unaffected.121
B. What a Test Ban Agreement Could—and Could Not—Accomplish
Here, it is convenient to start the discussion by highlighting what the
proposal does not restrict. As presented, this version of a test ban would not
affect the continued possession of ASAT systems of any variety; no numerical
cap on the numbers of such weapons would be imposed, and no elimination
of weapons would be required. Moreover, the contemplated agreement
would not affect the testing of directed-energy systems, such as high energy
laser weapons, provided they do not result in an explosion or other mass
fragmentation of the target.122 In addition, a party would be allowed to test
even its kinetic ASAT mechanisms in a non-impact mode: firing an inter-
ceptor against a pre-specified but vacant point in space. In like vein, rendez-
vous-and-proximity tests and operations would be allowed, even if they do
contribute to the development of ASAT capabilities, because they do not
generate indiscriminate debris and have many other benign applications,
too.123
An event such as the 2008 U.S. Burnt Frost downing of the failing USA-
193 satellite would represent a borderline case. It would probably be per-
mitted, principally because it did not generate “long-lasting” debris. Most
of the detritus from that collision fell back to Earth relatively promptly,
without substantial hazards to other spacecraft.124 Likewise, this proposal
120. See supra text accompanying note 16 (describing China’s 2007 kinetic-energy ASAT test); see also R
Grego & Wright, supra note 32, at 18–19 (advocating a moratorium on destructive ASAT weapons R
testing); Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 30 (recommending a ban on testing and use of R
ASATs); Beard, supra note 1, at 416–19 (identifying a ban on ASAT testing as the “best target” for an R
initial multilateral agreement); Liemer & Chyba, supra note 20, at 149. R
121. See supra note 56 (discussing the international guidelines from the IADC concerning best prac- R
tices for mitigating creation of new debris). Cf. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 20, at 154 (proposing to R
prohibit testing of debris-producing ASATs above a designated altitude, but to allow testing in lower
orbits).
122. A directed-energy ASAT weapon that permanently disabled its target would render that satellite
“debris,” but at least it would be one large item of debris, relatively easy for others to track and avoid. If
a high-energy ASAT laser caused the target to explode (such as by hitting a fuel supply), it would create
far more chaos in space; such a test would be barred by this proposal.
123. Under the Outer Space Treaty, a party that believes a planned space activity by another party
would cause “potentially harmful interference” with its own activities in the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space may request consultation. OST, supra note 36, art. IX; see also Liemer & Chyba, supra note R
20, at 154–55; Gubrud, Chinese and U.S., supra note 20, at 617 (criticizing the concept of an ASAT test R
ban); Gubrud, Not Arms Control, supra note 20; Krepon, supra note 11 (evaluating a prohibition on only R
those ASAT tests that resulted in collisions and debris).
124. See supra text accompanying note 17 for a discussion of Burnt Frost. Note that the United States R
characterized the Burnt Frost activity as not constituting an ASAT “test” and as not being a response to
China’s 2007 ASAT test, but, instead, as an operation intended to reduce an imminent hazard to Earth,
because the failing satellite might crash intact, inflicting damage on people and property underneath. See
Gene Stansbery et al., A Comparison of Catastrophic On-Orbit Collisions, 2008 Proc. Advanced Maui
Optical & Space Surveillance Tech. Conf. (comparing debris generated by various ASAT tests).
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would not inhibit most missile-defense testing, because the usual collisions
from those events occur at low altitudes.125
Turning now to the positive attributes of the proposal, this test-ban re-
gime would pursue two principal purposes, in addition to the general overall
goal of seeking to reinvigorate the long-moribund international dialog on
space security and arms control.
The first objective is to inhibit the development of at least one type of
ASAT technology. The concept here rests upon the “test-ban theory of arms
control”: countries will be reluctant to rely upon weapons that have not
been thoroughly tested, so the most effective mechanism for inhibiting the
next spin in an arms race is to deprive them of the opportunity to assure
themselves that the new evolving prototypes will, in fact, operate as in-
tended. In this view, blocking future qualitative improvements in a weapon
may be even more important than capping the sheer numbers of those de-
vices, and a test ban can be the key governor against innovations.126
This theory is not iron-clad; states sometimes do invest in weapons that
have not survived the crucible of rigorous testing.127 But prudence strongly
guides them in the opposite direction: a cautious budget office will be reluc-
tant to devote scarce resources to procurement of unproven systems, and
conservative military and civilian leaders will hesitate to rely upon arms of
unproven effect. The history of weapons development is littered with illus-
trations of conspicuous and expensive failures resulting from decisions to
forego customarily exhaustive testing, especially where new technology is
pushing the envelope of prior experience.128
In addition to helping retard the proliferation of ASAT capabilities, this
test-ban regime could, over time, reduce the confidence of countries that
have already completed their testing of debris-creating ASAT systems. That
is, even a proven military strength can atrophy if it is not regularly exer-
125. See supra text accompanying note 20 for a discussion of the overlap between ASAT and missile R
defense technology and testing.
126. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Loeb, Test Ban Proposals and Agreements, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at R
827, 844–45; Alan Neidle, Nuclear Test Bans: History and Future Prospects, in U.S.-Soviet Security Co-
operation, supra note 11, at 175, 184, 189–90. R
127. Conspicuously, South Africa was able to develop nuclear weapons, probably without conducting
any explosive tests. See Nuclear Disarmament South Africa, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti
.org/analysis/articles/south-africa-nuclear-disarmament/ (last updated July 2017); Nuclear Weapons: Who
Has What at a Glance, Arms Control Ass’n, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweapon-
swhohaswhat (last updated Mar. 2018).
128. See J. Michael Gilmore, U.S. Dep’t. of Def., FY 2016 Annual Report (2016) (describing
rigorous test and evaluation procedures for new weapons and characterizing the process as essential to
sound procurement decisions); Weeden, supra 11, at 18, 20 (concluding that a dedicated ASAT system R
would likely undergo substantial testing of increasing complexity and difficulty); Kingston Reif, Congress
Puts Bipartisan Arms Control Policies at Risk, 9 Arms Control Ass’n Issue Briefs (July 17, 2017),
https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2017-07/congress-puts-bipartisan-arms-control-policies-at-risk;
David Willman, The Pentagon’s $10 Billion Bet Gone Bad, L.A. Times (Apr. 5, 2015), http://graph-
ics.latimes.com/missile-defense/; see also MacDonald, supra note 9, at 18 (arguing that if debris-creating R
ASAT tests were banned, a country could still benefit from conducting “near miss” or fly-by tests, but
“China would not enjoy the confidence that normal testing would give it”).
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cised,129 and space weapons would be no exception. The U.S. and Soviet
legacy kinetic-energy interceptor systems that were deemed operational in
the 1980s, for example, largely deteriorated through desuetude in the subse-
quent decades, and their more recent ASAT enterprises had to start more or
less from scratch.130
The second objective for this partial test-ban regime is to avoid the gener-
ation of unnecessary space debris, via effectively channeling any ASAT com-
petition into the somewhat less damaging modes. That is, if countries are
going to continue, at least for now, in their headlong pursuit of ASAT capa-
bilities, at least they might agree to forego the most destructive
algorithms.131
China’s 2007 test was a true watershed, highlighting the catastrophic
harm of massive, long-lived debris creation, and perhaps inspiring the global
community to avoid further self-destructive fouling of our own communal
orbital nest.132 In one sense, this new awareness may already be too late—
some theorize that there is already so much debris in space that widespread
collisions are now unavoidable, and these impacts would create additional
plumes of debris that would cascade through space in a destructive, unend-
129. In the context of nuclear weapons testing, controversy has surrounded the fact that the CTBT
would prohibit all nuclear weapons testing; the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program was de-
signed to ensure that the weapons would remain secure and reliable indefinitely even without full explo-
sive confirmation. See Hugh Gusterson, A New Push for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?, Bull.
Atomic Scientists (Oct. 29, 2015), https://thebulletin.org/new-push-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-
treaty8830 (comparing nuclear weapons science and space science); Neidle, supra note 126, at 188; Ernest R
J. Moniz, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Editorial, A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, 354 Science 1081, 1081,
Nov. 30, 2016; Harold P. Smith & Richard S. Soll, Challenges of Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship under a
Comprehensive Test Ban, Arms Control Today (Mar. 1998), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_03/
ctbmr; Press Release, National Nuclear Security Administration, 20th Anniversary of U.S. Commitment
to Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (Aug. 14, 2015), https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/press-
releases/20th-anniversary-ssp-commitment. A test ban does privilege the states that have already under-
taken extensive testing; even if their confidence in the continuing integrity of the weapon will diminish
over time, those states will retain an experiential advantage over states that have never tested at all.
130. Grego, supra note 11, 7–8; Lambakis, supra note 5, at 27; Anatoly Zak, Russian Anti-Satellite R
Systems, Russian Space Web, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/naryad.html (last updated Nov. 30,
2017).
131. See Jinyuan Su, The Environmental Dimension of Space Arms Control, 29 Space Pol’y 58, 61–62
(2013); Michael J. Listner, The Account of NORAD 40258 and U.S. Options Under Article IX, Space
Thoughts Blog (Oct. 10, 2015), https://spacethoughtsblog.wordpress.com/2015/10/10/the-account-of-
norad-40258-and-u-s-options-under-article-ix/ (discussing the availability of consultations under art. IX
of the Outer Space Treaty, and the non-use of that provision by states); Douglas Loverro, Why the U.S.
Must Lead Again, Space Rev. (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3307/1 (arguing
that the United States should lead the effort to prohibit indiscriminate space weapons).
132. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 11 (asserting that “[s]pace debris poses a significant, R
constant, and indiscriminant threat to all spacecraft”); id. at 19–21 (assessing the existing volume of
debris, the history of collisions, and the international effort to restrict the creation of new debris); Wade
Boese, Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate, Arms Control Today (Mar. 1, 2007), https://www.arm-
scontrol.org/act/2007_03/ChinaSatellite; Theresa Hitchens, U.S.-Sino Relations in Space, China Sec.,
Winter 2007, at 12; Richard Weitz, U.S. Allies Criticize China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test; Media Notes
Concerns About U.S. Space Policies, WMD Insights, Mar. 2007, at 2; Fritz Lodge, Orbital Debris Crisis
Could Wreak Havoc on Earth, Cipher Brief (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/orbital-
debris-crisis-wreak-havoc-earth.
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ing chain reaction.133 As there is, at present, no operational capacity for
actively removing debris from space,134 the world’s space community has
come to place a greater emphasis upon avoiding the creation of new space
junk, especially reviling the most long-lasting debris injected into the most
popular and useful orbital slots.135
The United States, China, and Russia already seem to be moving their
ASAT ambitions in this direction, choosing to pursue non-destructive weap-
ons approaches over the traditional interceptors. The American position ex-
plicitly adopts this orientation: General John E. Hyten, the commander of
U.S. Strategic Command and responsible for oversight of the ASAT pro-
gram, has emphasized, “[T]o me, the one limiting factor is no debris.
Whatever you do, don’t create debris.”136 China and Russia have to date
been more circumspect about renouncing debris-creating ASATs, but
neither state has repeated anything like the catastrophic 2007 test.137 Some
133. European Space Agency, Space Operations: Space Debris 6 (Mar. 2017) (discussing ESA’s
policy of mitigating the creation of additional space debris in missions); IDA, supra note 1, at 7.5–7.7; R
Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 20–22 (anticipating future trends in growth of space debris and R
collisions between space objects); J.-C. Liou & N.L. Johnson, Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris, Science,
Jan. 20, 2006, at 340; Darren McKnight & Donald Kessler, We’ve Already Passed the Tipping Point for
Orbital Debris, IEEE Spectrum (Sept. 26, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/satellites/weve-al-
ready-passed-the-tipping-point-for-orbital-debris; Tereza Pultarova, Experts Call for Legislation and Im-
proved Tracking to Deal with Orbital Debris, Space News (Apr. 21, 2017), http://spacenews.com/experts-
call-for-legislation-and-improved-tracking-to-deal-with-orbital-debris/ (discussing the “Kessler Syn-
drome,” whereby space debris becomes so prevalent that collisions are unavoidable, resulting in a chain
reaction of additional collisions and the generation of still more debris).
134. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 26 (reporting on orbital debris mitigation research R
and early-stage prototype debris sweeping satellite); Lodge, supra note 132 (citing the concept of removal R
as “the holy grail of space debris”); Vedda & Hays, supra note 20, at 12–14; Al Anzaldua & Dave R
Dunlop, Overcoming Non-Technical Challenges to Cleaning Up Orbital Debris, Space Rev. (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2863/1; Al Anzaldua & Dave Dunlop, Why the US and Russia
Should Work Together to Clean Up Orbital Debris, Space Rev. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.thespacereview
.com/article/3156/1 (arguing for enhanced international cooperation in removing space debris); Tracking
Trash in Space Requires Global Cooperation, Cipher Brief (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.thecipherbrief
.com/tracking-trash-space-requires-global-cooperation (discussing concepts for removal of debris in inter-
view with Johann-Dietrich Woerner).
135. See Brachet, supra note 71, at 4–6; European Space Agency, supra note 133; Space Secur- R
ity Index, supra note 1, at 21; Beard, supra note 1, at 382–83; supra note 56 (discussing IADC guide- R
lines for reducing the creation of space debris).
136. Lee Billings, War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever, Sci. Am. (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.sci
entificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/; see also U.S. Dep’t of Def., Budget
Justification: Space Control Technology, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 (2004) (stating that U.S. mili-
tary policy is to “focus only on negation technologies which have temporary, localized, and reversible
effects.”); Betmann, supra note 34 (reporting Gen. Hyten’s assertion that the United States would pursue
only ASAT capabilities that would not create space debris); Seven Questions: Space Weapons, Part II, For-
eign Pol’y (Aug. 1, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/07/31/seven_ques
tions_space_weapons_part_ii (interview with Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, vice commander of U.S. Air Force
Space Command, who stated, “Our first priority is to use means that are temporary and reversible
means”).
137. See Pollpeter et al., supra note 3, at 17, 88–89 (contending that even before the 2007 test, R
Chinese analysts preferred non-destructive and temporary ASAT mechanisms to avoid debris and limit
escalation of a conflict, but there are still times when a hard kill method is valuable); Space Security
Index, supra note 1, at 25 (observing that recent ASAT tests by China and Russia have not produced R
large amounts of space debris, but experts disagree whether this reflects a lasting policy change by those
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other spacefaring states have not yet overtly entered the ASAT race, or they
have not clearly defined their technological preferences; perhaps they, too,
would recognize the virtues of avoiding the types of tests that could lead to
reduced availability of the orbital resources for all.138
This aspect of the test-ban regime, therefore, sounds as much in environ-
mental protection as in arms control—it does not, by itself, do much to
prevent the development of warfighting ASAT capabilities, but it tries to
prevent a bad debris problem from becoming much worse. For states that
have invested in selected types of counter-space capabilities, or for states that
have not yet committed themselves, a test-ban regime might help channel
their efforts in the preferred direction.139
C. Precedents for Test Bans in Arms Control
Many arms-control agreements have incorporated limitations on testing
as a key element in the regime of restrictions. As noted, the Outer Space
Treaty bans “the testing of any type of weapons” on the Moon or other
celestial bodies.140 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty contains a comparable limita-
tion for the southern continent,141 and treaties establishing “nuclear-
weapon-free zones” in selected geographic regions similarly obligate their
parties to refrain from nuclear testing.142 More pointedly, the 1979 Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (“SALT”) II Treaty restricted the United States and
the Soviet Union from, inter alia, developing more than one new type of
intercontinental ballistic missile each, and it enforced that limitation by
allowing each party to conduct flight testing of only one new such
weapon.143
The most expansive illustration of this principle comes from the realm of
nuclear weapons testing, in which a series of both legally-binding and polit-
ically-binding agreements has inhibited the conduct of developmental ex-
plosions. First, in 1958, both the United States and the Soviet Union
undertook voluntary moratoria against test explosions, albeit without ex-
states); Mike Gruss, U.S., China Will Meet This Year to Talk Space Debris, Space News (Sept. 22, 2016),
http://spacenews.com/u-s-china-will-meet-this-year-to-talk-space-debris/ (quoting U.S. diplomat as say-
ing that China now takes the problem of space debris “very seriously,” and that United States and China
have agreed that debris can be catastrophic).
138. Supra text accompanying note 5 (discussing other states interested in ASATs). R
139. See Group of Seven [G7], Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament ¶ 61 (Apr. 11, 2017)
(calling on all states “to refrain from irresponsible intentional destruction of space objects, including by
anti-satellite tests”); Su, supra note 131. R
140. OST, supra note 36, art. IV. R
141. Antarctic Treaty art. I.1, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
142. See, e.g., Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean art.
1.1(a), Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1968); Graham & LaVera, supra
note 51, at 41–97 (discussing current and proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones); John R. Redick, Nuclear- R
Weapon-Free Zones, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 1079. R
143. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms art. IV.9, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm [hereinafter SALT II] (not in force).
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plicitly defining precisely what activities would, and would not, be sus-
pended, and without specifying the duration of the self-restraint. The
interlude persisted for three years (even though France conducted its first
nuclear tests in the interval) until it was abruptly shattered by the Soviet
Union in 1961; the United States immediately responded with its own vig-
orous series of explosions.144
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (“LTBT”) was the first legally-bind-
ing instrument of its type. It was “limited” in the sense of prohibiting tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, while allowing them to
be conducted without restriction in deep underground chambers that would
confine the release of hazardous radioactive materials.145 Originally negoti-
ated among three states (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom) the treaty was opened for adherence by all others, and it
has attracted 125 parties (although not France or China, who have neverthe-
less both conformed to its restrictions).146 The LTBT deserves great credit
for staunching the production of strontium-90 and other dangerous radioac-
tive atmospheric pollutants, a boon for global public health. It has also con-
tributed to impeding proliferation and the nuclear arms race by making the
explosive testing of new nuclear weapons more expensive and cumbersome,
but countries soon found ways to accommodate its restrictions into their
testing practices.147
For comparison to the world of ASAT testing, it is further noteworthy
that some of the relevant states had begun to migrate toward underground
nuclear testing even before the LTBT was concluded, in acknowledgment of
the emerging global awareness of the environmental hazards of above-
ground explosions.148 With space weapons, the United States (and perhaps
144. Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 30; Loeb, supra note 126, at 829–32; Nuclear Testing and R
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline, Arms Control Ass’n, https://www.armscontrol.org/fact-
sheets/Nuclear-Testing-and-Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty-CTBT-Timeline (last visited Nov. 17,
2017); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Narrative,
U.S. Dep’t State, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
145. LTBT, supra note 114, art. I. This treaty is also sometimes cited as the Partial Test Ban Treaty. R
See generally James E. Goodby, Hoover Inst., The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
in 1961–63 (2017); Loeb, supra note 126, at 833–35; Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 29–31. R
146. See supra note 115 (noting the three “original parties” to the LTBT and the number of parties R
today).
147. The preamble to the LTBT, reflecting the parties’ collective object and purpose in the negotia-
tions, cites both a determination to pursue a comprehensive test ban and a desire to end the contamina-
tion of the environment by radioactive substances. LTBT, supra note 114, pmbl. para. 2; Terrence R. R
Fehner & F.G. Gosling, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing,
1951–1963, at 199 (2006) (observing that the LTBT banned atmospheric testing, “but legitimized
underground testing”—and made it politically respectable—by avoiding the worst public health contro-
versies); Shalikashvili, supra note 114, at 4 (“Restrictions on nuclear testing have figured prominently R
in efforts to slow the development and spread of nuclear weapons.”); Neidle, supra note 126, at 178 R
(stressing the LTBT as an important but limited step toward greater constraints on nuclear weapons); Su,
supra note 131, at 60. R
148. Fehner & Gosling, supra note 147, app. (listing U.S. nuclear tests, showing the transition R
from atmospheric to underground testing); Nuclear Testing, 1945–Today, Preparatory Commission for
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Org. [CTBTO], https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/
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Russia and China) are similarly moving from an emphasis on kinetic in-
terceptors toward a preference for more deft technologies, such as directed-
energy systems, in part because of the persistent, indiscriminate environ-
mental harm inflicted by debris-creating events. That transition does not
imply that a treaty codifying an agreement to refrain from debris-creating
ASAT tests would be superfluous, any more than the LTBT is redundant.
Writing the unilateral self-restraint policies into the discipline of law makes
a difference, and an affirmative act of treaty-making may draw more states
more tightly into the restraint regime.
Subsequently, the two superpowers also found it expedient to conclude
two additional, interim test ban treaties on a bilateral basis. The 1974
Threshold Test Ban Treaty149 and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty150 confined the size of the underground detonations to 150 kiloton
yield; they, too, may have inhibited the refinement of the most colossal
weapons.151
Decades later, the interaction between politically-binding national mora-
toria against testing and legally-binding treaties played out again, with each
device usefully reinforcing the other. The culmination of the step-by-step
growth in the constraints was the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(“CTBT”),152 which would categorically and permanently prohibit all nu-
clear explosive testing in any environment. In capping the qualitative im-
provement in nuclear weapons, the CTBT would establish a most telling
restriction; President Bill Clinton referred to it as “the longest-sought,
hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control.”153 The CTBT has not
yet entered into force, due to not being ratified by several key states, includ-
ing the United States.154 Nonetheless, pending the treaty’s implementation,
the leading powers have each suspended further testing, pursuant to offi-
history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2018) (noting U.S. under-
ground testing prior to the conclusion of the LTBT, while France and China continued atmospheric
testing through the 1970s).
149. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974,
1714 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter TTBT]. The TTBT preamble recalls the LTBT commitment to pursue a
comprehensive test ban and notes that the TTBT would contribute to that objective. Id. pmbl. paras.
2–3.
150. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 28, 1976,
1714 U.N.T.S. 432.
151. Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 372; Loeb, supra note 126, at 836–37; Neidle, supra note R
126, at 179–81, 184 (assessing how much the 150 kiloton ceiling contributed to arms control). In the R
TTBT, the two parties committed to continuing their negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban
treaty. TTBT, supra note 149, art. I.3. R
152. CTBT, supra note 114. R
153. William J. Clinton, President, Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session of U.N. General
Assembly (Sept. 22, 1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970922-20823.html.
154. Pursuant to art. XIV, the CTBT will not enter into force until it has been ratified by all forty-
four states identified by name in the treaty’s Annex 2. To date, thirty-six of the required states, and 130
other countries, have ratified the treaty, but the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and some other
key players have not. CTBT, supra note 114, art. XIV.1; CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/ (last visited R
Nov. 17, 2017).
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cially declared national moratoria or tacit practice.155 The United States has
not conducted any nuclear tests since 1992; Russia has been similarly inac-
tive since 1990.156 Even though the treaty has lingered for more than two
decades without entering into force, many speculate that, with the exception
of rogue North Korea, the era of nuclear testing is, de facto, finished, unless
some very major, unforeseen adverse circumstance intervenes.157
Again, this chain of precedents does not guarantee future success in the
very different sphere of outer space. But it is nonetheless instructive to note
that from unpretentious beginnings—a temporary, non-legally-binding sus-
pension of nuclear testing by only some of the affected states—has grown a
much more robust regime. Moreover, some of the incremental steps toward
a complete test ban regime were quite humble; some contributed as much to
environmental protection as to arms control. Even more, the process has
consumed six decades, and the culminating step—the entry into force of the
CTBT—has not yet been achieved, but the illustration of the value of a test
ban is impressive.
IV. Cooperative Space Situational Awareness
The Article’s third proposal is of a different character and somewhat
harder to explain. In a nutshell, the hypothesis is that spacefaring countries
should unite to pool their resources in monitoring outer space and sharing
the data about the location, trajectory, and attributes of space objects. This
enhanced “space situational awareness” (“SSA”) would enable all interested
states to use space more effectively by avoiding collisions and by clarifying
the nature of untoward events, and it could also form the basis of a verifica-
tion regime to support the two previous measures.
155. See 1994–96, Debating the Basic Issues, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-
treaty-negotiations/1994-96-debating-the-basic-issues/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (recounting that the
CTBT does not define a nuclear weapon “test,” so controversy continued about the legitimacy of various
“subcritical” experiments and “stockpile stewardship” programs).
156. Nuclear Testing 1945—Today, supra note 148 (also identifying the last nuclear tests by United R
Kingdom (1991), France (1996), China (1996), India (1998), and Pakistan (1998)). The leading coun-
tries have also affirmed that a nuclear weapon test by a CTBT signatory would violate international law
as an act that would “defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty. S.C. Res. 2310, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2016);
Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federa-
tion, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Sept. 15, 2016), https://newsroom.ctbto.org/2016/09/
16/joint-statement-on-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-by-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-
treaty-nuclear-weapon-states/; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
157. Lassina Zerbo, The Challenges to Ratifying the CTBT—Can the No-Test Norm Be Maintained Indefi-
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A. The SSA Proposal and Its Variations
Some additional background is necessary in order to help frame this pro-
posal. Space situational awareness refers to the ability to know what is going
on in outer space: what space objects (both human-made and natural) are out
there, where they are, where they are headed, what their approximate size
and composition are, and to some extent what their capabilities, activities,
and inherent nature might be.158
A wide variety of globally-distributed instruments and routines contrib-
utes to the SSA mission. Most notable is the dispersed U.S. array of ground-
based optical telescopes, lasers, different genres of radar systems, and other
sensors that regularly scan the skies for distant travelers; it incorporates
eight dedicated and eighteen multi-mission establishments. Space-based
sensors, too, persistently observe various altitudes and orbital inclinations.
Altogether, the United States blends some 375 sensors and systems, drawing
upon private as well as public sources.159
The United States has long maintained the world’s best capability for
monitoring space, and it is continuously improving the network—at a cost
of approximately $1 billion per year. The current upgrade effort, designated
as erecting an enhanced “space fence,” is intended to observe even quite
small, obscure, and remote space traffic—reportedly, it will enhance the cur-
rent observational power by ten times. The U.S. sensor grid is unusually far-
flung; it receives (or will soon receive) input from facilities in Australia, the
Marshall Islands, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere.160 The current system is
generally capable of detecting objects larger than ten centimeters in diame-
ter, depending upon the item’s altitude and reflectivity.161 In 2016, the
United States lofted two new sensors into the geosynchronous orbit, in order
158. Emily Nightingale et al., Evaluating Options for Civil Space Situational Aware-
ness (SSA) 11–13 (IDA Paper NS P-8038, 2016); NRC Report, supra note 1, at 39–40; Space Secur- R
ity Index, supra note 1, at 38 (defining SSA as “the ability to detect, track, identify, and catalog objects R
in outer space . . . ; observe space weather and [threatening near-Earth objects]; and monitor spacecraft
and payloads for maneuvers and other events”); Brian Weeden, Secure World Found., Space Situa-
tional Awareness Fact Sheet (2017); Stefan A. Kaiser, Legal and Policy Aspects of Space Situational
Awareness, 31 Space Pol’y 5, 6 (2012); Brian Weeden et al., Global Space Situational Awareness Sensors,
2010 Proc. Advanced Maui Optical & Space Surveillance Tech. Conf.
159. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts
and Planned Budgets (2015) [hereinafter GAO]; Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at R
33–37; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 40; Weeden, supra note 158; Kaiser, supra note 158, at R
7–9; Weeden et al., supra note 158, at 3–9. R
160. GAO, supra note 159; Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 49; Lambakis, supra note R
5, at 45–47; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the U.S. SSA capability is “far in R
advance of the rest of the world”), 40, 42 (describing the Space Fence, expected to be fully operational in
December 2018, bringing greatly augmented observation power); Weeden, supra note 158; Weeden et R
al., supra note 158; Betmann, supra note 34. R
161. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 19, 20 (commenting that because of the great distance R
to the geosynchronous orbit, an object there would usually have to be one meter in size to be detected
currently).
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to provide more proximate and detailed watchfulness over that precious
zone.162
The U.S. SSA network has identified an inventory of some 23,000 space
objects and has catalogued over 17,000 of them.163 But many orbital items
are so small as to remain essentially invisible; experts estimate that there are
some 500,000 additional uncontrolled objects in space between one and ten
centimeters in diameter and untold scores of millions smaller than that (but
still capable of inflicting serious harm on a satellite in a collision).164
The United States disseminates much of its SSA data, in order to help
satellite operators minimize interference, understand satellite anomalies, and
avoid collisions. Sixty-three data-sharing agreements are already in place
with foreign countries, international organizations, and commercial opera-
tions in several nations.165 In 2014 alone, the U.S. system provided 671,727
warnings to satellite managers about possible collisions, resulting in 120
avoidance maneuvers.166 The International Space Station, for example, con-
ducted four sudden orbital adjustments in 2015, to dodge human-created
space debris.167
Some space actors do not want to rely upon an SSA apparatus that is
owned and controlled exclusively by the U.S. government,168 and they have
pursued independent capabilities.169 Russia has the world’s second-largest
capacity, cataloging some 5000 space objects, and has announced plans to
upgrade the system via deployment of ten next-generation ground sta-
162. Lambakis, supra note 5, at 45–47; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 41, 42 (noting that R
the United States had also previously launched two new satellites into the geosynchronous orbit in 2014,
in order to improve SSA there); Betmann, supra note 18; Mike Gruss, Space Surveillance Sats Pressed into R
Early Service, Space News (Sept. 18, 2015), http://spacenews.com/space-surveillance-sats-pressed-into-
early-service/; see also Nightingale et al., supra note 158, at 5–7 (discussing the possibility of shifting R
to a civilian agency some of the functions currently performed by the U.S. military for maintaining the
public catalog of space objects and for warning satellite operators about possible collisions).
163. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 19, 23; Satellite Box Score, Orbital Debris Q. News, R
Aug. 2017, at 12 (listing 4,495 active payloads and 14,145 pieces of debris in space).
164. European Space Agency, supra note 133, at 2 (estimating 750,000 pieces of debris between R
one and ten centimeters in size and 166,000,000 smaller than that); Space Security Index, supra note
1, at 19, 23. R
165. U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 24, ¶ 4.j(1); Tiffany Chow, Secure World Found., Space
Situational Awareness Sharing Program 1–18 (2011); Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note
1, at 17, 33–37; Nightingale et al., supra note 158, at 20–22; Space Security Index, supra note 1, R
at 43; Beard, supra note 1, at 387; Frank A. Rose, Assistant Sec’y of State, Bureau of Arms Control, R
Verification and Compliance, Remarks at the Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technolo-
gies Conference: Strengthening International Cooperation in Space Situational Awareness (Sept. 22,
2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/262502.htm.
166. European Space Agency, supra note 133, at 8 (reporting that the European Space Agency R
undertakes an average of twelve collision avoidance maneuvers annually); GAO, supra note 159, at 23; R
Nightingale et al., supra note 158, at 3; Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 40. R
167. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 24. R
168. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 35–36; Charles Phillips, Time for Common Sense R
with the Satellite Catalog, Space Rev. (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3215/1
(explaining that the U.S. Air Force entity that maintains the satellite catalog used to be the Joint Space
Operations Center; it has been redesignated as the 18th Space Control Squadron).
169. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 35–36; IDA, supra note 1, at 8.1–8.3. R
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tions.170 The European Union and the European Space Agency have a lim-
ited but growing SSA capability, and China, India, and Canada have devoted
increased resources to this effort, as well.171
The private sector, too, has invested in SSA mechanisms—part of what
some observers label “the democratization of space”—and it is official U.S.
policy to try to incorporate this commercial input into the governmental
system.172 Space Data Association, founded by major commercial satellite
operators, has become a focal point for sharing information about members’
satellite positions, and additional entrepreneurs have undertaken to provide
independent, timely, non-discriminatory data.173 Likewise, zealous amateur
astronomers, university observatories, and other space enthusiasts comb the
heavens and report their findings.174
This growing—and somewhat overlapping and redundant—investment
in synoptic SSA capabilities provides multiple benefits. First, greater sensi-
tivity can provide enhanced warning about possible collisions, which have
already begun to plague space actors.175 Just as important, improved intelli-
gence-gathering can reduce the frequency of false alarms, mitigating the
number of occasions on which a satellite is forced to undertake an expensive,
and ultimately unnecessary, evasion maneuver.176
More ominously, if something does go wrong with a satellite, SSA sys-
tems can help diagnose the cause. A sudden interruption in satellite func-
tioning could be triggered by an internal malfunction, a collision with an
undetected piece of natural space material, an accidental impact with an-
other human-created object, or a deliberate attack by an enemy. Obviously,
170. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 41, 44; Weeden, supra note 158; Weeden, et al., supra R
note 158, at 5–6. R
171. European Space Agency, supra note 133; Pellegrino & Stang, supra note 59, at 45–48; R
Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 40, 45; Weeden et al., supra note 158, at 5–6; Victor Robert R
Lee, China Builds Space-Monitoring Base in the Americas, Diplomat (May 24, 2016), https://thediplomat
.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-the-americas/ (describing China’s new space track-
ing facility in Argentina).
172. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 17, 34–36; IDA, supra note 1, at 8.1–8.3; The R
White House, supra note 73, at 7; Nightingale et al., supra note 158, at 26–28; Weeden, supra R
note 158; Beard, supra note 1, at 387–88; Dave Baiocchi & William Welser IV, The Democratization of R
Space, Foreign Aff. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2015-04-20/democ-
ratization-space; Phillips, supra note 168, at 3. R
173. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 41, 43–44. R
174. Weeden, supra note 158; Charles Phillips, Acknowledging Some Overlooked Satellites, Space Rev. R
(June 12, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3259/1.
175. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 21 (listing major collisions between two spacecrafts, or R
between a spacecraft and human-caused space debris); Comm. for Assessment of NASA’s Orbital
Debris Programs, Nat’l Research Council, Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft
(2011), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13244.
176. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that the International Space Station has R
undertaken twenty-five collision avoidance maneuvers since 1998; when the warning signal arrives too
late for the station to maneuver, the crew has “sheltered in place” in an attached spacecraft that could be
used for an emergency evacuation).
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the appropriate response would be quite different in the distinct scenarios,
and it can be quite difficult to gauge the source and motivation remotely.177
Improved SSA can help identify the true nature of an incident and attri-
bute its cause, enabling a condign response. If responsibility can be reliably
assigned to another human agent—whether the explanation sounded in neg-
ligence or intention—legal liability can follow. That type of accountability
and damage assessment can deter both sloppy and aggressive behavior,
which inadequate SSA might otherwise mask.178
At the same time, it should be noted that there are costs to improved
SSA, too. The United States and other countries conduct some “black” sat-
ellite operations, in which they intend that the location, orbital path, and
functions—or even the mere existence—of the vehicle remain secret. The
public U.S. satellite inventory, for example, does not include selected intelli-
gence-gathering objects, and conjunction warnings are not issued about
them.179 That covertness is more difficult to maintain when diverse SSA
sources proliferate. Already, the satellite inventories made public by some
states reveal data that others attempt to restrict, and even amateur astrono-
mers are able to detect, track, and identify some classified systems—the race
between the “hiders” and the “seekers” becomes more one-sided as SSA
capabilities expand.180
As a final introductory point, it should be observed that the challenge of
improving SSA, or even maintaining its current level, is likely to increase in
the near future. Rapid technological change, in the form of “ultra low cost
access to space” (that is, much less expensive mechanisms for launching
satellites, pioneered by philanthrocapitalists and strategic investors) and
miniaturized “cubesats” (that is, constellations consisting of hundreds or
thousands of very small, unmaneuverable orbiters) will confound the
177. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 12, 33–36 (discussing natural environmental hazards in R
space), 39 (discussing the importance of differentiating technical malfunctions, natural disruptions, and
space negation attacks).
178. Note that under the Liability Convention, supra note 45, arts. II–III, a state that launches a R
satellite is obligated to pay compensation if its satellite causes damage on the surface of the Earth or to an
aircraft (absolute liability) or causes damage to another satellite (for fault). But the victim must establish
the national identity of the spacecraft that caused the damage, and acquiring that type of evidence can be
difficult. Krepon, supra note 26, at 15, 28.
179. Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 40, 43; Phillips, supra note 168, at 1 (asserting that the R
U.S. government “has excellent reasons for hiding the missions of certain satellites”); Brian Weeden,
Time for the U.S. Military to Let Go of the Civil Space Situational Awareness Mission, Space News (Sept. 12,
2016), http://spacenews.com/time-for-the-u-s-military-to-let-go-of-the-civil-space-situational-awareness-
mission/.
180. Phillips, supra note 168, at 3 (discussing non-governmental satellite tracking systems, including R
those operated by commercial firms and amateurs); Russia to Reveal Location of US Military Satellites in Free
Space Database—Report, RT (June 22, 2016), https://www.rt.com/news/347744-russia-satellites-database-
norad/ (observing that countries do not always maintain secrecy about each other’s military satellites);
Weeden, supra note 18 (noting that hobbyist astronomers are able to track a U.S. military satellite not R
included in the publicly-released governmental catalog). Also note the offensive aspect of SSA: improved
knowledge about the location, trajectory, and nature of another country’s satellites enhances the ability to
attack those spacecraft; SSA can be used for aggressive as well as defensive purposes.
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monitors. There will soon be much more traffic in space—by one count,
3800 new satellites by 2020—some of it very hard to identify and track.181
With that background, the proposal for enhanced international SSA now
appears. The suggestion here is that countries would freely contribute
equipment, data, and expertise to a shared global mechanism for monitoring
space and broadly reporting the results. The apparatus would be more capa-
ble than any one country could achieve on its own, since it would draw upon
the amalgamated resources from all over the world and assemble the best
equipment and talent to process and disseminate the acquired data. Presum-
ably, the United States, China, and Russia, as the predominant space actors,
would take the lead in developing, outfitting, and staffing the consortium,
but other states would be expected to contribute, too. The system would
include space-based and ground-based sensors, together with rapid commu-
nications links and central processing, to ensure timely, global, and persis-
tent observation of all orbital regions. The scheme would attempt to record
and publicize “ephemeris data” (information about the current and pre-
dicted location) of all operational and defunct space craft and significant
debris, as well as whatever information can be gleaned about the satellite’s
characteristics (for example, size, shape, and composition).182
Perhaps there would be international quality-control criteria applicable to
qualify the radars and other sensors, and they would probably have to be
standardized to report their data in a common format, and to ensure the
accuracy, authenticity, and timeliness of the information. Negotiated inter-
national quotas could lead to equitable sharing of the responsibility and the
costs, with each participating state accepting its portion of the burden. Per-
haps some states or organizations would voluntarily commit additional re-
sources as necessary to complement the system’s other assets and to plug any
perceived gaps in coverage. The ground-based and space-based collecting
181. Air Univ., supra note 10; Todd Harrison et al., Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., Impli-
cations of Ultra-Low-Cost Access to Space (2017); Nightingale et al., supra note 158, at 3 R
(citing one estimate that the number of near collisions in space will rise by a factor of seventy); Sean Cate
& Jesse Sloman, Operating Under Constant Surveillance, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. Mag., May 2016, https://
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016-05/operating-under-constant-surveillance; Brian Weeden,
Insight: Small Satellites and Space Situational Awareness, Secure World Found. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://
swfound.org/news/all-news/2016/09/insight-small-satellites-and-space-situational-awareness (last up-
dated Nov. 3, 2016) (estimating 3800 new satellites by 2020, which would almost quadruple the ex-
isting population). See generally Daniel Querejazu & Lucien Randazzese, Ctr. for Strategic &
Int’l Studies, Small Satellites, Big Missions: The Implications of the Growing Small Satel-
lite Market for Launch and Key Applications (2017); Ting Wang, A Liability and Insurance
Regime for Space Debris Mitigation, 24 Sci. & Global Security 22 (2016) (assessing the challenge of
microsatellites); Vedda & Hays, supra note 20, at 9 (noting numerous plans for even larger satellite R
constellations).
182. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing proposals for collaborative SSA); R
Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 40 (assessing that “a complete picture of the space environment R
and of activities in space is beyond the capability of any single actor at present,” because complete SSA
requires a global network of sensors and data sharing with satellite operators); Kaiser, supra note 158, at 7 R
(assessing that accuracy, comprehensiveness, and reliability of SSA can be assured only by pooling data
from a wide range of sensors).
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stations might be financed and owned by individual states, private actors, or
a new global organization. Some of the sensors might be designated to re-
port all their data immediately and automatically, while others could be on
tap on an as-needed basis.183
A new international data-fusion and -analysis center would be created to
receive, process, interpret, and distribute the information. This could be an
expensive undertaking, requiring contributions of top-level computer capa-
bilities, human talent, and other resources. This center would have an inter-
national personality, not within the control of any one state or coalition.184
In principle, this contemplated system could be crafted simply by states
undertaking mutually aligned, non-legally-binding behaviors, but the over-
all scheme does contemplate a degree of permanence, as well as a substantial
and sustained financial investment. The plan would be more firmly
grounded in a new treaty, creating responsibility for a shared “neighborhood
watch” program in space, and embracing the enduring commitment and
precise documentation, together with the elaboration of the status, privi-
leges, and immunities of a new international organization.185
Some participating states may decide to continue to maintain, at least for
a period of time, their own independent national SSA routines as an autono-
mous back-up check on, or supplement to, the international mechanism.186
But others might conclude that redundant fallbacks are unnecessarily expen-
sive, and they could rely exclusively on the global collection and analysis.
183. Kaiser, supra note 158, at 8 (discussing different levels of cooperation in SSA); Baiocchi & R
Welser, supra note 172 (saying that it is time to centralize SSA data in one location, requiring govern- R
ments to agree on policies and technologies for data sharing); Rose, supra note 65 (calling for enhanced R
international cooperation in SSA).
184. Cf. Hugh Chalmers & Angela Woodward, Monitoring Space, 152 Trust & Verify 7, 7 (2016)
(“It is timely for the international community to explore the desirability and feasibility of developing a
multilaterally designed, constructed, and operated space-to-space surveillance and tracking system.”);
Jasani, supra note 17, at 21 (suggesting the establishment of an International Data Centre to collect R
information about space objects’ shapes, sizes, orbits, etc.); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Considerations on the Set of Prime Requirements and Factors That Should Shape the Policy of the
International Information-Sharing Serving Safety of Space Operations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.303 (Mar.
16, 2016) (Russian proposal for additional international sharing of data regarding satellites).
185. It would also be desirable for a treaty establishing the global SSA program to address the ques-
tion of immunity from legal liability, as the United States has done via statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2274(g)
(2016).
186. For comparison, in the realm of nuclear test monitoring, the United States maintains and contin-
uously upgrades its own Atomic Energy Detection System, consisting of 3600 sensors distributed world-
wide, supported by 1000 personnel, as an independent supplement to the CTBT verification system, see
infra text accompanying notes 199–202. See also Air Force Technical Applications Center, 25th Air Force R
(Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.25af.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/333995/air-force-techni-
cal-applications-center/; John Pike, AFTAC Introduction, Fed’n Am. Scientists, http:/www.fas.org/irp/
agency/aftac/intro.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20090107234719/http:/www.fas.org/irp/agency/
aftac/intro.htm]. In addition, the U.S. Global Seismographic Network includes 150 dispersed seismic
monitoring stations. GSN—Global Seismographic Network, U.S. Geological Surv., https://earth-
quake.usgs.gov/monitoring/gsn/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2018); see also Shalikashvili, supra note 114, at 7 R
(discussing how the Atomic Energy Detection System will continue to operate in parallel with the
CTBT’s multilateral monitoring system).
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B. What an SSA Agreement Could, and Could Not, Accomplish
Notably, this proposal does not physically prevent a state from undertak-
ing unfriendly or destructive behaviors in outer space, nor does it define
additional offenses against the public order of outer space. Instead, by pene-
trating the cloak of invisibility that currently obscures some remote activi-
ties, enhanced global SSA would simply make it harder for a bad actor to get
away with those adverse practices in secret. It relies upon greater trans-
parency to elicit better behavior, since states would have less expectation of
impunity.187 Moreover, the program might be capable of providing a degree
of “early warning” about emerging threatening behaviors via observation of
nascent or ambiguous activities, and it could provide internationally-ac-
cepted documentary evidence of countries’ space activities, helping to satisfy
global standards of objective proof.
An upgraded SSA capability could also provide spin-off benefits in en-
hancing awareness of space weather and related phenomena. These applica-
tions would be largely collateral to the system’s security goals, but they
could be quite valuable on a day-to-day basis in supporting satellite
operations.188
Of course, even a greatly improved global observation capacity would still
be imperfect, with enduring gaps in coverage; some unwelcome space acts
could still proceed unseen. Moreover, in many cases, even an exquisite array
of sensors and processors would generate only ambiguous data, susceptible
to competing interpretations and explanations. Accordingly, the proposal
cannot promise to resolve all potential ASAT controversies.
C. Precedents for Shared SSA in Arms Control
There are a great many at least partial precedents for this concept of
shared monitoring in support of an arms-control agreement. Several treaties
embrace some version of cooperative verification, through which partici-
pants collaborate in collecting and synthesizing relevant information.189 As a
more general matter, outer space, in particular, has been a venue in which
state-to-state cooperative ventures (and, for that matter, collaborations be-
tween public and private sector entities) have been spectacularly success-
ful;190 perhaps those patterns could now be extrapolated.
187. Nayak, supra note 4 (stressing the value of a greater ability to detect hostile action in space). R
188. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, National Space Weather Strategy (Oct. 2015).
189. See Eisenhower Ctr. for Space & Def. Stud., supra note 51, at 63–64 (presenting a typology of R
arms-control verification regimes).
190. See Space Security Index, supra note 1, at 64–69, 90, 108 (discussing international coopera- R
tion as a “defining feature” of civil space activities, from the Apollo–Soyuz program to the International
Space Station and noting numerous strategic partnerships between the United States and other countries
on space exploration and exploitation).
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Familiar arms-control treaty tactics include data exchanges,191 on-site in-
spection,192 and the inauguration of new international organizations.193
Some treaties explicitly authorize the use of “national technical means” of
verification (for example, satellite reconnaissance), accompanied by a prohi-
bition upon interference with those operations or deliberate concealment of
relevant activities.194 Other treaties authorize “multinational technical
means” (joint verification enterprises of various sorts).195 Under the 1992
Open Skies Treaty,196 parties throughout Europe and North America have
agreed to allow each other to overfly their sovereign territory with aircraft
equipped with a suite of photographic, radar, and other sensors, to detect
military-related sites and activities, and to do so on short notice and with
few exclusions.197
A recurrent vision of an “International Satellite Monitoring Agency” has
long animated dialog, as a vehicle for ensuring that all states—not only
those that can afford the most elaborate space resources—could participate
in remote sensing of specified terrestrial weapons-related activities. How-
ever, no such institution has yet been created.198
The best illustration of the concept, however, comes from the CTBT, for
which an impressive International Monitoring System (“IMS”) has been
191. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8,
1987, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty,
1657 U.N.T.S. 1, SALT II Treaty, supra note 143, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Estab- R
lishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.
192. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 114, art. IV.D, Protocol, Part II; Antarctic Treaty, supra note 141, art. R
VII; CWC, supra note 97, art. IX. R
193. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 114, art. II; CWC, supra note 97, art. VIII; Treaty on the Limitation R
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Common Understanding Regarding the Establishment
of a Standing Consultative Commission, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into
force Oct. 3, 1972, no longer in force) [hereinafter ABM Treaty], Memorandum of Understanding Re-
garding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission.
194. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. IX, July
31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 [hereinafter START I Treaty]; see, e.g., ABM Treaty, supra note
193, art. XII. R
195. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 114, art. IV (not using the term “multinational technical means,” but R
containing similar provisions); Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe art. XV, Nov. 19, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or CFE Treaty] (entered into force July 17,
1992).
196. See generally Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37 (1992).
197. See Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 822; Amy Woolf, Cong. Res. Serv., The Open R
Skies Treaty (Aug. 10, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10502.pdf; Treaty on Open Skies, U.S.
Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/os/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
198. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Dep’t. for Disarmament Affairs, The Implications of Estab-
lishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, U.N. Doc. A/AC.206/14 (Mar. 1983); U.N. Secre-
tary-General, International Cooperation in Space Activities for Enhancing Security in the Post-Cold War Era,
U.N. Doc. A/48/221 (July 1, 1993), http://www.un.org/events/unispace3/docs/sgrep.htm; A. Walter
Dorn, Peacekeeping Satellites: The Case for International Surveillance and Verification, Walter Dorn, http://
walterdorn.net/19-peacekeeping-satellites-the-case-for-international-surveillance-and-verification (last
visited Apr. 3, 2018).
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elaborately crafted, even prior to that treaty’s entry into force.199 When com-
pleted, the network will consist of 337 stations and laboratories, located in
eighty-nine countries.200 The network exploits four complementary technol-
ogies to gather information about possible clandestine nuclear explosions on
the land, under water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space.201 Data are
transmitted via a dedicated satellite-based Global Communications Infra-
structure to the International Data Centre in Vienna, Austria.202
The IMS stations must be certified as meeting state-of-the-art interna-
tional standards. Construction and operational costs are usually borne by the
CTBT’s international organization, and the stations are operated by local
institutions under contract.203
The International Data Centre processes and analyzes the incoming data
streams, compiling bulletins about relevant events and swiftly and securely
transmitting the information to states.204 The process has been operational
since 2000, and it has served to validate the capability of the system to
detect, locate, and characterize events of concern, such as the North Korean
nuclear tests.205
In addition, the IMS has provided additional value, in scientific research,
and in detecting undersea earthquakes that could trigger dangerous tsuna-
mis. This mechanism has enabled immediate warning to affected Pacific
Rim countries and communities, saving countless lives.206 This spin-off ben-
efit is perhaps analogous to the way an enhanced satellite monitoring system
199. Verification Regime, Preparatory Comm’n for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Org., https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
200. CTBTO, supra note 154 (noting 289 stations are currently operational and certified; the remain- R
der are in the process of being certified, constructed, or planned); Overview of the Verification Regime,
CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/background/overview-of-the-verification-regime/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (monitoring stations in eighty-nine countries will contribute data).
201. Overview of the Verification Regime, supra note 200 (explaining that the CTBT International Moni- R
toring System uses four complementary verification methods: seismic (to monitor underground events),
hydroacoustic (oceanic), infrasound (atmospheric), and radionuclide (to detect radioactive debris)).
202. Global Communications Infrastructure, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-
global-communications-infrastructure/page-1-gci/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
203. Overview of the Verification Regime, supra note 200 (explaining that the building and operational R
costs are usually borne by the CTBTO, and stations are operated by local institutions under contract to
the CTBTO).
204. Distribution of Data and Data Bulletins to Member States, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/
?id=1296 (last visited Nov. 16, 2017); History of the International Data Centre, CTBTO, https://www
.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-international-data-centre/history-of-theinternational-data-centre/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2017); Operations Centre and Computer Centre, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/verifica-
tion-regime/the-international-data-centre/operations-centreand-computer-centre/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2017).
205. DPRK Nuclear Tests, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-
sept-dprk/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
206. Spin-Offs for Disaster Warning and Science, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/
spin-offs-for-disaster-warning-and-science/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017); The March 11 Japan Disaster,
CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-11-march-japan-disaster/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2017).
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could contribute to global safety by flashing warnings about imminent sat-
ellite collisions or natural space hazards.
Conclusion
As emphasized throughout the analysis, this Article’s three proposals are
hardly revolutionary; they cannot be promoted as a true “problem-solving”
approach, because even in concert they would be insufficient to completely
redress the emerging security dilemmas regarding outer space. Many, no
doubt, would prefer a more ambitious avenue, reasoning that if we are going
to undertake the heavy lifting necessary to overcome the institutionalized
resistance to any measures of arms control in space, we should aim for a
bigger payoff.207
The Article presents its three proposals independently, for separate analy-
sis and consideration, but there may also be noteworthy synergies among
them. For example, if space situational awareness were to be enhanced via
international sharing of data and resources (the third recommendation), it
may become easier to verify states’ compliance with a limited test ban (the
second suggestion). Reciprocally, an effective test ban would help retard the
generation of still more space debris, which should facilitate the task of
monitoring the material that is already in orbit. Likewise, if the proffered no
first use regime (the first concept) were in place, it might enhance confi-
dence in states’ benign intentions in space, paving the way for the other
more ambitious, operational measures.
Still, a first step is needed, and the hope here is that modest but savvy
incremental measures, especially when so firmly rooted in the successful
precedents of arms control in other areas, can attract political support and
catalyze subsequent enhancements.
Certainly, something needs to be done. The surging threats to the stabil-
ity and security of the inherited space regime have brought us to an inflec-
tion point, and the United States has the most to lose from a deterioration in
the usability and reliability of satellite resources. Even if American ingenu-
ity and economic muscle could “win” an arms race in space, such competi-
tion would only propel the world more vigorously in a direction we do not
want to go. A planet bristling with advanced counter-space capabilities in
three or more states would be precarious, indeed, and perennial notions of
deterrence would provide only weak assurance. Because of the current, and
likely future, asymmetry in the exploitation of space—as the United States
civilian economy and military forces continue to rely on satellites more
heavily than our rivals do—the exposure and vulnerability are asymmetric,
too. The constellation of policy objectives now should include efforts to re-
207. See Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 170 (discussing a potential “grand space bargain” to R
resolve several problematic issues simultaneously).
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duce and refine the offensive capabilities of our potential adversaries—and
arms control offers the surest mechanism. A regime of reciprocal restraint
from the pursuit of ASAT capabilities would both play to long-term U.S.
strengths and promote a more durable international regime for all.208
Persistent diplomatic failures make it difficult to plot a course for success
in space arms control. The Outer Space Treaty remains vital, but its few
specific military-related provisions are old, barebones, and permissive.209
The European Union’s bland proffered Code of Conduct and the Rus-
sia–China tender of a loophole-laden PPWT have both conspicuously failed;
the Conference on Disarmament has degenerated; and the general deteriora-
tion in global political relations makes this a tough time for reasoned mea-
sures of international arms restraint.210
Still, arms control has managed to flourish during tough times before—
indeed, many of the accords noted above were concluded during the darkest
days of the Cold War—and it is precisely during the stressful epochs that
diplomatic ingenuity is most necessary.211 Notably, going back to the
Apollo–Soyuz mission in 1975, outer space has been especially valuable as a
vehicle for continued cooperation, even when other modes are politically
constricted. Some shreds of this “space exceptionalism” linger today, even in
the midst of current U.S.-Russian antagonism. Perhaps humble measures
designed to pursue mutual interests in preserving the utility of the space
208. Colby, supra note 1, at 17 (“[B]ecause some degree of vulnerability in space appears to be R
inevitable and because the United States is near certain to need to continue relying on space, the United
States must find ways to protect its equities in space at least in part by persuading its adversaries not to
exploit those vulnerabilities. More precisely, the United States needs to find ways to induce, convince,
coerce, deter, dissuade, coax, incentivize, or otherwise persuade potential adversaries that can threaten
U.S. space assets not to act on that ability or to limit the extent to which they do.”); Krepon, supra note
26, at 38 (arguing for reassurance based on reciprocal restraint, rather than solely relying upon deterrence
in space).
209. Hansel, supra note 54, at 91. R
210. See Olga Oliker, U.S.-Russian Arms Control: The Stakes for Moscow, 47 Arms Control Today,
May 2017, at 6.
211. Goodby, supra note 145, at 3–4, 12 (observing that the successful negotiation of the LTBT R
followed a “terrible year” in East–West relations); Tatiana Anichkina et al., The Future of US-Russian
Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control, 73 Bull. Atomic Scientists 271 (2017) (concluding that danger-
ous threats will eventually provide new opportunities where international cooperation is both needed and
politically feasible); Krepon, supra note 11 (regretting that “there are few diplomatic instruments and no R
diplomacy among major powers to serve as even a slight counterweight to the military competition now
underway”); Maggie Tennis, Russia Suggests Revived Arms Talks, 47 Arms Control Today, May 2017, at
33 (noting Russian interest in resuming a “pragmatic” dialog on arms control); Frank A. Rose, Assistant
Sec’y of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Remarks at the International Sym-
posium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space: Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-Term Sus-
tainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment (Apr. 16, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/
avc/rls/253947.htm (noting U.S.-U.S.S.R. progress on arms control during some dark periods of the Cold
War, and commenting, “[I]f the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas of mutual interest
in the realm of nuclear deterrence and chemical weapons—with the tensions and stakes as high as they
were—then in today’s climate we should be able to find areas of mutual interest among all space-faring
nations regarding space security”).
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environment could help nudge the world an inch away from the present
earthborn contention.212
The tradition of arms control is often to start with baby steps and to
accelerate the process only when a measure of successful implementation has
been achieved. The 1972 SALT I agreement, for example, was essentially
only a temporary “freeze” or cap on U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals; SALT
II in 1979 tried in a discreet way to begin the process of gradually reducing
the inventories, and it failed to enter into force; it was only the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (“START”) I in 1991 that imposed substantial cuts
and New START in 2010 that chopped the arsenals in more meaningful
ways.213
With even more timidity, sometimes arms control begins by recording
states’ solemn promises not to build or test weapons that they do not really
want, need, or are not technologically capable of building anyway. Some
elements of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty might fit that description,
as well as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty214 and the 1971 Seabed Arms Control
212. Hitchens & Johnson-Freese, supra note 1, at 29–33 (arguing in favor of “diplomacy first” in R
approaching space security); Krepon, supra note 26, at 33 (arguing that the major powers have managed
to cooperate, as well as compete, on nuclear matters, and “[t]hey can do so in space, as well”); Space
Security Index, supra note 1, at 121 (observing “the shrinking opportunity to separate activities in R
space from geopolitical flashpoints on Earth”); David Filipov, Space, Nuclear Security, Polar Bears: Russia
and the U.S. Still Agree on Some Things, Wash. Post (Aug. 25, 2017), http://wapo.st/2pw2fyT (observing
that despite the generally strained relations, the United States and Russia still cooperate on certain
matters, including space activities); David Dunlop, Applying Lessons from Apollo for a Smart Space Agenda at
a Time of Increased International Tension, Space Rev. (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/3328/1; Johnson-Freese & Hitchens, supra note 25 (noting that the United States and Russia have R
managed to maintain a working relationship on the International Space Station, even when other aspects
of their interactions are politically strained); Russia, U.S. Agree to Create 1st Lunar Space Station, PressTV
(Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/09/27/536698/Russia-US-lunar-space-station-Mars-
NASA; Simon Saradzhyan, U.S.-Russian Space Cooperation: A Model for Nuclear Security, Bull. Atomic
Scientists (Mar. 7, 2017), https://thebulletin.org/us-russian-space-cooperation-model-nuclear-secur-
ity10600 (describing how the United States and Russia have been “continuing to work together in
exploring the cosmos,” and suggesting using that example to help reestablish a productive partnership in
other areas).
213. Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-
Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5 [hereinafter New START Treaty] (entered into force
Feb. 5, 2011); Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July
31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20; SALT II Treaty, supra note 143; Interim Agreement Between the R
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter
SALT I Interim Agreement] (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972); Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at R
306–09, 336–37, 343–47, 883–89.
214. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 141. The Antarctic Treaty records the parties’ agreement to use R
Antarctica “for peaceful purposes only,” and to prohibit “any measures of a military nature,” such as the
establishment of military bases, the conduct of military maneuvers, and the testing of weapons. Id. art. I;
see Graham & LaVera, supra note 51, at 13 (describing the Antarctic Treaty “as an example of nations R
exercising foresight and working in concert to prevent conflict before it develops,” on the premise that
“to exclude armaments is easier than to eliminate them once they have been introduced”); Christopher C.
Joyner, The Antarctic State Treaty, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 817, 821 (“The Antarctic Treaty R
merits appreciation for its preventive character.”).
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Treaty.215 Perhaps that quixotic legacy can be drawn upon for quarantining
destructive ASAT systems, too.
In one sense, the proposals of this Article could be categorized as confi-
dence-building (or confidence-, transparency-, and security-building) mea-
sures, rather than as genuine arms control, since they do not directly limit or
reduce the armed forces or armaments of the participants.216 There is a long
record of success in confidence-building approaches, including for outer
space, and a complicated relationship between those instruments and true
disarmament.217 The parallel structures of the non-legally-binding Helsinki,
Stockholm, and Vienna Documents,218 intertwined with the legally-binding
1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,219 illustrate how different types
of approaches can reinforce each other, as long as political circumstances
permit.220
215. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701
(entered into force May 18, 1972) [hereinafter Seabed Arms Control Treaty]. The treaty prohibits the
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor outside a narrow coastal zone. Id. art. I; see Graham
& LaVera, supra note 51, at 283 (noting that, like the Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty R
“sought to prevent the introduction of international conflict and nuclear weapons into an area previously
free of them”); see also Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques art. I, May 18, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152, (prohibiting the use of certain envi-
ronmental modification techniques for military or hostile purposes). Graham and LaVera observe that
tactics of that type have “not played a major role in military planning for many years,” but might do so
in the future. Supra note 51, at 464. R
216. See generally U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (2013); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, at R
12–18; Jakhu et al., supra note 40, at 12–14; Xiaodan Wu, China and Space Security: How to Bridge the Gap R
Between Its Stated and Perceived Intentions, 33 Space Pol’y 20, 24–28 (2015); Rose, supra note 65. R
217. U.N. Secretary-General, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Study on the Application of Confi-
dence-Building Measures in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/48/305 (Oct. 15, 1993); Robert Friedman, Dep’t of
State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Remarks at the 3rd ARF Workshop on Space Security in Beijing, in
Digest of United States Practice in International Law 547, 549–50 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon
ed., 2015), (supporting non-legally-binding confidence building measures as an important, expeditious
mechanism for strengthening the rule of law in space).
218. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”), as well as its predecessor
structures, has generated a series of non-legally-binding agreements over more than thirty years to
strengthen European security by implementing a variety of confidence-building measures. See Graham &
LaVera, supra note 51, at 1272–73; James MacIntosh, Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: 1975 to the R
Present, in Encyclopedia, supra note 11, at 929; Arms Control, OSCE, http://www.osce.org/arms-control R
(last visited Nov. 16, 2017); Overview of Vienna Document 2011, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state
.gov/t/avc/cca/c43837.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
219. CFE Treaty, supra note 195. The CFE Treaty attempts to reduce the danger of conventional R
warfare in Europe by limiting the holdings of most of the states in Europe and North America in several
categories of military equipment, including tanks, aircraft, and attack helicopters. See Graham &
LaVera, supra note 51, at 592–98; Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Nuclear Threat R
Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2017); The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE
Treaty at a Glance, Arms Control Ass’n, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe (last visited Nov.
16, 2017).
220. The CFE Treaty is facing serious challenges today, as Russia has suspended its implementation of
its treaty requirements, and the United States has responded by ceasing to carry out certain of its own
obligations. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, supra note 219; Treaty on Conventional R
Armed Forces in Europe, supra note 219. R
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Overall, there are many options for diplomats to exercise. The proposals
of this Article could be cast in legally- or politically-binding form; they
could be expressed in a written, signed text or in parallel but unilateral
national statements of intention; they could be instituted as temporary,
short-term vehicles, or endowed with generous initial durations. To be most
meaningful, any accord would require initial buy-in at least from the United
States, China, and Russia—the three major players moving most zealously
toward greater military engagement in space. But there are multiple other
stakeholding countries, and their interests must be accommodated, too, at
least to ward off a potential flood of other entrants into the space-weapons
race.
A major contention in this Article is that precedent matters. Sometimes,
it is easier to sway potential doubters or resisters by demonstrating that we
are not proposing anything that is too new or different—that the current
ideas are just modern applications of familiar, tried-and-true tactics that
have succeeded in other milieus. There is no guaranty, of course; sometimes
familiarity breeds contempt, and sometimes opponents will still resist re-
peating either a perceived failure or a mechanism that did, indeed, succeed
in taking the world in a particular disarmament direction. Moreover, many
of the precedents cited in this Article initially arose decades ago, in the
context of bilateral U.S.-Soviet (or Russia) relations, but today it is China
that is widely perceived as posing the most fateful challenge to U.S. space
superiority.221 But it should nonetheless be instructive to review the relevant
history, to understand more fully how the deliberations of prior generations
led to the crafting of rules, institutions, and procedures that can now be
fruitfully applied in new contexts.
What could come next in space arms control, if these initial steps were to
succeed? The crystal ball is hazy, but there are numerous tantalizing ideas
and proposals. Surely, any efforts to negotiate a more meaningful bite out of
an ASAT arms race would quickly encounter severe difficulties. Negotia-
tions might well founder over the definition of an anti-satellite weapon
(when so many space vehicles are inherently multi-purpose); the definition
of a test (and how to deal with the overlap between ASAT-development and
missile-defense tests); and the provisions for verification of compliance (be-
cause states so jealously guard their space programs and would resist open-
ing themselves to meaningful inspection).222 But there is nothing
221. MacDonald et al., supra note 1, at 14 (concluding that “China presents the most prominent R
military space challenge to the United States.”); Bill Gertz, STRATCOM Worried by Slow Pace of U.S.
Nuclear Modernization, Wash. Free Beacon (July 31, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/national-
security/stratcom-worried-slow-pace-u-s-nuclear-modernization/ (quoting Gen. Hyten as ranking “China
a little bit ahead of Russia” in developing threatening space warfare capabilities).
222. Beard, supra note 1, at 414–23 (suggesting future steps for arms control in space); Rose, supra R
note 65; see Nancy Gallagher & John D. Steinbruner, Am. Acad. of Arts & Scis., Reconsider- R
ing the Rules for Space Security (2008); Grego & Wright, supra note 32; Richard A. Bruneau & R
Scott G. Lofquist-Morgan, Verification Models for Space Weapons Treaties, in Building the Architecture
for Sustainable Space Security, Conference Report 73 (2006).
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“inevitable” about an arms race in space; still less is armed conflict outside
the atmosphere foreordained and inescapable.223
If the EU Code and the PPWT are inadequate and defective, the United
States should not just criticize and exhibit passive-aggressive slow-rolling;
instead, it is incumbent upon the United States to seize the initiative and
develop better, more efficacious concepts. The United States should not just
“consider” arms-control proposals for space (as the Obama administration’s
Space Policy apathetically stated the posture).224 Instead, it should exercise
active leadership commensurate with its civilian and military investment in
space.
This Article emphatically does not advocate simple unilateral self-re-
straint by the United States. The three ideas assessed here are not based on
passivity and a naı¨ve hope for enlightened reciprocity by others. Instead, the
call is for aggressive diplomacy, seizing the occasion to exercise international
leadership in attempting to forge a more satisfactory and complete space law
regime. The United States cannot concoct global arms control on its own,
but a strong American influence and sustained engagement are essential to
build international consensus and generate concerted action.225
To emphasize, this is not “arms control for the sake of arms control,” nor
are the three proposals designed simply to be more conducive to the misty
goal of preserving space as a mythically special place. Instead, the objective
is to pursue global stability and U.S. national security by retarding the in-
cipient slide toward a space arms race that would be distinctly disadvanta-
geous. Unless decisive action is undertaken soon, the retrograde erosion of
the freedom and usability of space will likely accelerate, with the United
States having the most to lose.
The world has repeatedly alternated between arms racing and mutual re-
straint in ASAT testing and development; exploration of modalities for
space control and negation seems to come in erratic waves, punctuated by
moments of moderation. Now is the time to entrench the self-discipline,
establishing effective, durable international discipline.
To echo the title of this Article, the problem is not that arms control in
outer space is inherently so much more complicated or difficult than arms
control in other areas. Certainly, the challenges of capping the incipient race
223. Krepon, supra note 11. But see Betmann, supra note 34 (observing that the inevitability of future R
space war is a broadly shared conclusion among the key national security space actors in the United
States); Jakhu et al., supra note 40, at 9 (citing Pollpeter et al., supra note 3) (observing that some R
experts conclude that China believes that space war is inevitable). See generally Johnson-Freese, supra
note 1, at 57–68. R
224. See The White House, supra note 73, at 7. R
225. See Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics, Ensuring U.S. Leadership in Space
(2016) (arguing for continued U.S. leadership in space); Grego & Wright, supra note 32, at 13–14, 28; R
Loverro, supra note 131; see also Weber & Drell, supra note 11, at 393, 397 (calling for the United States R
to exercise “contingent restraint” in the development of ASAT capabilities). See generally Ronald
O’Rourke & Michael Moodie, Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Role in the World (2017) (high-
lighting questions about U.S. international leadership under the Trump administration).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 58 21-JUN-18 12:17
388 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 59
to establish counter-space capabilities will be profound, but other security
realms have posed seemingly intransigent hurdles, too. No, the problem is
human politics—both domestic and international—not the domain in
which the controversies play out. Since the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the
world has witnessed major disarmament advances within the purview of nu-
clear arms (for example, START I under President Ronald Reagan, New
START under President Barack Obama); chemical weapons (the Chemical
Weapons Convention under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clin-
ton); and biological weapons (the Biological Weapons Convention under
President Richard Nixon). None of those accomplishments was easy or auto-
matic; at multiple points, it seemed that success was far from assured—but
the negotiators pressed forward.
Today, the resistance to effective arms control in outer space seems espe-
cially entrenched; even modest measures provoke a strong allergic reaction.
Still, as Shakespeare’s Cassius advised Brutus, objective circumstances can
make some tasks extremely difficult—but fate and “the stars” do not con-
trol our destiny.226 Instead, the fault is in ourselves; humans can overcome
the frustrations and the challenges of governance—and we now have the
occasion, the provocation, and the responsibility to try.
226. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act 1, sc. 2 (“Men at some time are masters of their
fates; The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”).
